




Directorate of  
Intelligence

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# Angola: A Handbook

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September 1984

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# Angola: A Handbook

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## A Reference Aid

This paper was prepared by

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Division, ALA, [redacted] or Chief, Africa  
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## Angola: A Handbook

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**Introduction**

*Information available  
as of 15 June 1984  
was used in this report.*

Angola entered the community of nations in late 1975 in the worst of circumstances—and from which it has never recovered. The country was not so much granted independence as it was flung free by the centrifugal forces that made a revolution in Portugal and shattered an empire. As the empire crumbled, most Portuguese officials and citizens in Angola desperately sought to escape before the deluge—which everyone knew was coming—could descend. And as assorted internal factions and their foreign backers scrambled for advantage, Lisbon handed power to the flimsiest of coalitions, composed of the three major—and mutually antagonistic—insurgent groups: Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Fighting among the three erupted even before the independence niceties could be arranged and was quickly followed by tribal violence and the unleashing of centuries of anger that produced attacks against anything Portuguese. With the aid of a massive Soviet arms airlift, a 15,000-man Cuban expeditionary force, and the collapse of external support for the moderate factions, Neto's MPLA routed its opponents within months. For a brief moment, it appeared that MPLA leaders could set about the business of building the Marxist system they had long promised to bring to Angola.

Roberto's insurgents never recovered from the shellacking, but the wily and patient Savimbi retreated to his remote base in southeastern Angola, cemented his military supply relationship with the South Africans, and ultimately put together one of the more effective political and military organizations in modern Africa. Today, UNITA controls a third of Angola, roams freely through another third, and conducts damaging raids throughout much of the remainder of the country. The increasingly besieged and faction-ridden MPLA government in Luanda remains in power largely because of continuing massive Soviet military assistance and the presence of some 30,000 Cuban praetorians.

The Marxist regime in Luanda is also still paying a heavy price for its decision to allow Sam Nujoma and his Soviet backers to move the South-West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) operations into southern Angola, from there to conduct guerrilla raids into Namibia. The result has been not only to bring the full wrath of the South African Army against SWAPO, Cuban, and Angolan forces in the area, but to inextricably link Namibian

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independence, Angolan reconciliation, South African strategic interests, and the Cuban troop issue into a virtual diplomatic grid lock that consumes the diplomatic energies of numerous regional and some external actors.

In other circumstances, Angola might have quickly become one of the continent's economic bright spots. Angola is endowed with a range of abundant natural resources that few in Africa can boast. Oil, diamonds, iron ore, rich and well-watered land, substantial hydroelectric production and potential, a substantially better-than-average transportation system, and a relatively well-developed consumer-goods manufacturing industry all characterized Angola on the eve of independence. Even without the military, political, and social chaos that has taken place over the past nine years, however, the Angolans might not have been able to take advantage of these benefits. The Portuguese, splitting squarely into the historical winds that had been sweeping Africa in the postwar era, considered Angola an integral part of Portugal and had trained few Angolans for more than common labor jobs. Since independence, the only industry to avoid collapse has been the Western-managed oil sector; much of the revenue from oil production, however, has gone to pay for Cuban troops and Soviet weapons.

So, nearly a decade after independence, Angola's economy is in the worst shape it has been in 50 years. The governing regime is torn by racial, ideological, and personality schisms, seemingly incapable of making decisions on the critical issues—national reconciliation, Cuban troop withdrawal, and accommodation with South Africa—that are necessary before any substantial economic development can occur. Meanwhile, the pressures on Luanda grow daily, and these decisions may ultimately be made by others than those now wielding what is increasingly a facade of power in Luanda.

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**Figure 1**  
**Angola at a Glance**

Boundary representation is  
not necessarily authoritative.

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## Geography

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### Area, Location, and Boundaries

Angola is one of the larger countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, with an area of 1,245,790 square kilometers, nearly twice the size of Texas. Angola is entirely within the tropics and extends 1,600 kilometers along the Atlantic coast. [redacted]

Cabinda, which comprises 7,270 square kilometers, is separated from the rest of Angola by the mouth of the Congo River and some 30 kilometers of Zairian coastline. Cabinda was of little importance to the rest of the country until the discovery of oil off its shores during the late 1950s; large-scale production began in the 1970s. An influx of refugees from Angola proper and Zaire has increased the population of Cabinda in the last decade. [redacted]

### Topography

Angola can be divided into three geographic regions: the Coastal Plains (including Cabinda), Western Highlands, and Interior Plateau. [redacted]

The Coastal Plains consist of three sections: a northern area (about 150 kilometers wide), a narrow central belt (only a few kilometers wide at the most), and a southern section (about 100 kilometers wide). Each has a predominantly flat or rolling landscape mostly no more than 200 meters above sea level. Several large rivers cross the northern plains from the interior; the rivers crossing the central and southern plains are much smaller. Cabinda is flat with many marshy areas. Offshore, the cold, northward-flowing Benguela Current substantially reduces the amount of rainfall along the coast south of Benguela. As a result, the central and southern sections are quite dry. The area south of Benguela is the northern extension of the Namib Desert—referred to locally as the Mocamedes Desert. [redacted]

The Western Highlands consist of a continuous north-south belt of mountains and hills interspersed with a few scattered plains. The mountains, which are in the 2,500-meter range, are the remnants of an ancient plateau that was heavily eroded by the upper and middle courses of westward-flowing streams. The

streams flow perennially in the northern and central sections and intermittently in the southern section. [redacted]

The Interior Plateau, which covers nearly the eastern two-thirds of the country, comprises high plains and scattered hills and is commonly known by the Portuguese term "planalto." The *planalto* is flat, with altitudes ranging from 1,000 to 1,800 meters above sea level. The geographic center of the country is in the highest part of the region, and all of Angola's major rivers radiate from it. River valleys are rarely more than 100 meters below the surrounding land. [redacted]

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Angola's major rivers flow in several directions. Some flow more or less directly west to the Atlantic Ocean, providing water for irrigation on the Coastal Plains and potential for hydroelectric power. Others flow south and east into the Zambezi River and ultimately to the Indian Ocean. The Cubango and a few others flow into the Okavango Swamps in Botswana and eventually evaporate. [redacted]

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Several large rivers delineate portions of the country's boundaries. To the north, the Congo River forms a short segment of Angola's boundary with Zaire. Two tributaries of the Congo—the Cuango and the Casisai—make up parts of the northern and eastern boundaries. Portions of the southern and eastern boundaries are set by the Cunene, the Cubango, the Cuito, and the Cuando. [redacted]

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### Climate and Vegetation


Like the rest of tropical Africa, Angola's climate is marked by clearly defined wet and dry seasons. In the north, the rainy season can last as long as seven months—from September/October to April/May, with perhaps a brief slackening in January or February when the tropical rainy belt has moved south to the general latitude of Zimbabwe and northern South Africa. In the south, the rainy season begins later—November/December—and lasts no more than four months. The three winter months (June, July, and August) are almost without rain in most of the country. [redacted]

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*The high plains—with UNITA  
soldiers—near Bie Province.* [redacted]



Precipitation is generally highest in the north, but at any latitude it is greater in the interior than at the coast and increases with altitude. Average rainfall ranges from less than 50 millimeters on the southern coast to over 1,500 in the northeast. Most places receive from 125 to 250 millimeters each month during the wet season. [redacted]

Humidity is high during the entire year along the coast and during the rainy season in other regions. In most places, relative humidity averages more than 80 percent in the morning and between 60 and 75 percent in the afternoons. Humidity below 40 percent is common in the interior. [redacted]

Average temperatures decrease with distance from the equator and with altitude. Temperatures are generally warm to hot in the afternoon, except at the highest elevations of the Western Highlands and along the southwest coast where they are cooled by the Benguela Current. [redacted]

Vegetation is dense in the wet areas and sparse in the hot, dry areas. A tropical evergreen rain forest is found in the wet and hot northern border region and to the south of that area along major rivers. Some of this forest has been cut to provide lumber and clearings for coffee plantations. Most of the northern half of the Interior Plateau and the northern section of the Coastal Plains are woodland, consisting of sparse to

moderately dense broadleaf deciduous forest and scrub. As rainfall diminishes to the south, the forest gives way to savanna dominated by elephant grass, averaging about 1 meter in height, and isolated baobab and acacia trees. The forest remains dense, however, along water courses. The southern section of the Coastal Plains is largely barren or covered by sparse desert grass and small shrubs. [redacted]

#### **Natural Resources**

Angola is richly endowed with natural resources—principally oil, diamonds, iron ore, and fish:

- Oil is concentrated offshore near Cabinda, in the area around Luanda, and in the northwest just south of the mouth of the Congo River.
- Diamonds, of which about 80 percent are gem quality, are produced by the government-controlled DIAMANG corporation in the extreme northeast.
- Iron ore is mined at several locations in the Western Highlands, although high-grade ores (63 percent iron) began to run out in the mid-1970s.
- The fishing industry depends on the Benguela Current, which runs northward near the shore and provides an abundance of nutrients for fish. Most of the catch is processed for export. [redacted]

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
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**Figure 2**  
**Vegetation and Precipitation in Angola**



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Angolan agriculture is centered primarily in the well-watered Western Highlands and the northern part of the Interior Plateau. Until the Portuguese left in the mid-1970s, some 2,500 coffee plantations produced about 70 percent of Angola's coffee; the other 30 percent was grown by about 250,000 small farmers. Coffee has long been the principal export crop; other traditional agricultural exports include cotton, sisal, bananas, and tobacco.

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## Demography

Angola's population, estimated by the United Nations in mid-1983 at 7,651,000, is almost entirely black African. There are around 150,000 mulattoes. [redacted]

About 400,000 Portuguese left the country at the time of Angolan independence in 1975, taking with them much-needed managerial, technical, and vocational skills. About 500,000 Angolan Africans also fled to neighboring countries, especially Zaire, to escape the preindependence turmoil and to seek employment.

About 300,000 of them had returned by 1981, according to press reports. [redacted]

The Angolan population is growing at an annual rate of natural increase (the excess of births over deaths in a given period) of 2.6 percent. This represents a slight increase over the rate between 1975 and 1980, resulting from a slight decline in the infant mortality rate, which today stands at 153 per 1,000. Because of this infant mortality rate—one of the highest in the world—average life expectancy is only 44 years. [redacted]

### Africans

Black Angolans are divided into over 100 different tribes, but three-fourths belong to one of the three major tribal groupings. Almost all use some variant of the Bantu-language family, which are sometimes mutually intelligible, partly because of their similar grammatical structure and partly because the people of different tribes have often had a long history of contact with one another. [redacted]

The *Ovimbundu* are the largest group—37 percent of the population. They live mainly in the west-central part of the country. Like most large African tribes, the Ovimbundu were formed by the merging of groups of different origins and varying sizes [redacted]

Many Ovimbundu migrated to other parts of Angola during the post-World War II period to seek work. Some found jobs in the cities, on the Benguela Railroad, and on European-owned coffee plantations and farms. Many joined the UNITA insurgent group in the last years of Portuguese rule. UNITA is still made up largely of Ovimbundu. [redacted]

The *Kimbundu* are the second-largest group—about 25 percent of the population. Their home territory, located north of the Ovimbundu region, includes the capital of Luanda, to which many Kimbundu have migrated. Those Kimbundu living close to Luanda were subject to a high degree of Portuguese influence, and their dialect includes numerous Portuguese terms. These people call themselves Ambundu or Akwaluanda, which distinguishes them from the rural Kimbundu. [redacted]

The *Bakongo* are the third-largest group—13 percent of the population. They live in the far northwest and in the enclave of Cabinda, where most of the people are Bakongo. Before the arrival of the Portuguese in the 15th century, Bakongo tribesmen of the aristocratic, hierarchic Kongo Kingdom dominated an area that extended over much of what is now Angola, Zaire, and Congo. Legends of past Kongo glory remain a unifying factor among the Bakongo. [redacted]


The *Chokwe-Lunda* consists of two peoples who now tend to think of themselves as a single grouping and make up 8 percent of the country's population. The Lunda are descendants of the once farflung Lunda Empire, which in the 17th to 19th century was centered in what is now the eastern part of Zaire's Shaba Region. The Chokwe are descended from a group of hunters and traders who lived in the area of the headwaters of the Cuango and Cassai Rivers, near the southern periphery of the Lunda Empire, until the latter half of the 19th century. Chokwe expansion in that period led to conflict with the Lunda and eventually to a Chokwe invasion of the Lunda capital. The mixture of the two groups since then has acquired the label Chokwe-Lunda. [redacted]

Scattered throughout the southern third of Angola are a large number of small tribes who together make up about 15 percent of the total population. Until the 20th century most of them were nomadic hunters and

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**Figure 3**  
**Population Density in Angola**



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**Table 1**  
**Angola: Ethnic Composition**  
**of the Population, 1983<sup>a</sup>**

Group	Population	Percent of Total
Ovimbundu	2,830,900	37
Kimbundu	1,912,800	25
Bakongo	994,600	13
Chokwe-Lunda	612,100	8
Ganguela	612,100	8
Haneca-Humbe	229,500	3
Ovambo	153,000	2
Other Africans	153,000	2
Mulatto	153,000	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,651,000</b>	<b>100</b>

<sup>a</sup> The total population is based on a UN estimate for mid-1983. We have estimated the sizes of the tribes as of 1983 by projecting the relative proportions of each group at the time of the Angolan census of 1970.

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gatherers, although some engaged in herding. Most have now turned to cultivating the land, but some remain nomadic or seminomadic. Largely nomadic peoples in Cuando Cubango Province in southeastern Angola speak languages of the Xu-Angola or Malingo group, referred to as click languages. Several other hunting and gathering or herding groups in the southwest speak Bantu languages and are less nomadic than the click speakers. [redacted]

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#### **Mulattoes**

Most of the approximately 2 percent of the population who are mulattoes are urban dwellers and speak Portuguese. Although some of the relatively few rural mulattoes live in a traditional manner like most Africans, during the colonial period most achieved the status of *assimilados*—a term applied to those non-whites who were considered Portuguese citizens. [redacted]


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With some exceptions, mulattoes historically tend to identify with Portuguese culture. Despite the involvement of mulattoes in the anticolonial struggle and their important role in the ruling MPLA party, much of the black African population resents them. [redacted]

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**Figure 4**  
**Major Tribal Groups in Angola**



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Economy

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## Economy

### Postindependence Decline

Prior to independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola's great endowment of natural resources and generally upward trend of prices for its major products—oil, coffee, and diamonds—offered considerable promise for the future. In addition, the country already had a transport system surpassing that of most African countries. Hydroelectric production and potential and petroleum output and vast reserves offered independence from external energy sources. The agricultural sector produced foodstuffs in quantities generally adequate to feed the population as well as significant volumes of coffee for export. There was also a relatively well-developed consumer goods manufacturing industry. [redacted]

The departure of most of the Portuguese in the mid-1970s triggered a sharp decline in the economy. The Portuguese had occupied almost all managerial, technical, and professional positions; made up most of the skilled labor force; and—along with consumers in Portugal—represented the bulk of the middle-class market:

- Commercial agriculture was hardest hit as seasoned Portuguese plantation owners emigrated and the colonial marketing and distribution system collapsed.
- Manufacturing, the fastest growing economic sector prior to independence, began operating well below capacity, primarily because of the loss of Portuguese skills and purchasing power.
- Mining was crippled by the loss of technicians as well as equipment, including vehicles and aircraft, taken by the Portuguese.
- The Western-run petroleum industry was the only sector to remain largely unaffected because of the continued operations of Western oil companies.

[redacted]

The situation was made worse by the new government's drive to socialize most factories, banks, mines, processing plants, refineries, and plantations abandoned by the Portuguese. Committees of largely unskilled workers complicated the difficult job of

inexperienced and untrained managers. Bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and chronic shortages of raw materials, fuel, and spare parts undermined productivity. [redacted]

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The continuing guerrilla war also hindered economic recovery. In the late 1970s guerrillas increased attacks on bridges, railroads, trains, roads, vehicular traffic, and government installations. The fighting was most intense in southern Angola, where much of the country's food production is concentrated. Farmers began cutting back plantings to avoid harassment from insurgent, government, and Cuban forces. [redacted]

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The introduction in 1976 of several thousand Communist civilian economic and technical advisers, mostly Cubans, failed to revive the economy. Although occupying key advisory positions in almost every economic ministry, they were too few and too lacking in familiarity with local conditions, management techniques, and Western machinery to fill the void left by the Portuguese. [redacted]

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As a result, toward the end of the 1970s the Angolans increasingly began to turn to Western capital, technology, and manpower to revive the economy and as an alternative to exclusive reliance on the Soviets, Cubans, and East Europeans, with whom they were already growing disenchanted. The government adopted a liberal investment code in 1979. Because of President dos Santos's economic overtures to the West, Angola received strong non-Communist official assistance—primarily from European and Arab donors, and attracted considerable private investor interest [redacted]


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Even these actions allowed only a brief respite from the country's downward economic trend. The increase in oil revenues associated with rising world oil prices and Western aid did provide a temporary improvement in living standards as food and other badly

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**Figure 5**  
**Economic Activity in Angola**



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
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
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**Figure 6**  
**Petroleum Activity in Angola**



needed consumer imports rose by 20 percent. The increased availability of goods did little for agriculture and mining, however, which continued to suffer from the fighting. Moreover, with the exception of the petroleum industry, investors were jittery about making large long-term commitments because of the insurgency. As a result, most contracts stipulated that projects would begin only after the security situation improved.

**Figure 7**  
**Angola: Commodity Prices and Production Trends, 1974-83**



<sup>a</sup> Data reflect average prices for South African diamonds.

<sup>b</sup> Pegged to official Nigerian sales prices.

<sup>c</sup> Estimated.

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Drying coffee beans: once an important cash crop.

### Key Sectors

**Agriculture.** Angola's farming sector—which employs about 80 percent of the population—has never recovered from the postindependence plunge despite government efforts to increase production and a return to normal rainfall following several years of drought. The loss of Portuguese management and sabotage by UNITA in central Angola has destroyed almost all of the modern farms in what was once the country's breadbasket. The expanding insurgency now also endangers farms in Malanje Province close to Luanda. Much of what is produced is intercepted by insurgents. A shortage of parts for machinery and a lack of seeds and fertilizer add to farmers' problems. As a result, most rural Angolans rely on subsistence agriculture to satisfy immediate family needs, leaving Luanda little choice but to continue to import food for urban consumers. The migration of farmers to urban areas to escape both drought and the chaos caused by UNITA placed added pressure on the government's limited resources.

Efforts to boost output of coffee, Angola's major export crop, have brought few results. Coffee volume is stagnant because of marketing problems and the poor security situation in coffee-growing regions. In many areas farmers pulled up coffee trees, planting subsistence food crops in their place because government purchasing agents failed to appear

**Mining.** Mining of extensive reserves of diamonds, found principally in Lunda Norte province in the region around Lucapa, is the country's second most important foreign exchange earner. Since the late 1970s, however, the industry has been declining—from \$315 million in 1980 to \$130 million in 1983. The decline appears to have been associated with a large upswing in illicit mining, smuggling, and the sharp drop in prices.

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Iron ore mining, which had increased nearly tenfold between 1960 to 1971 when it reached 6.2 million metric tons, has halted completely because of the poor security situation in central Angola. We estimate that reserves are in excess of 100 million metric tons, but the grade of ore is relatively low. The government and an outside investor are developing plans for reopening the mines and getting the ore to the export point. Iron ore in the past has been exported mainly to Japan, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.

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**Fishing.** Although depressed in recent years, fishing historically has been a leading industry and domestic food source. Namibe (Mocamedes), Lobito, and Lunda are the main fishing centers. The government has pushed for revival of the fishing industry as a way to meet the domestic food requirement. The Soviet Union, however, has been taking substantial quantities of fish from Angola's waters (200 nm). While part of the catch has been delivered to Angolan processing facilities, by far the greater amount has been sent abroad.

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**Transportation.** Although most of Angola's transport network was constructed to serve domestic and colonial trade, the Benguela Railroad can also provide an Angola-Zaire-Zambia link as greater regional trade develops. It is one of three Angolan rail lines, all of which extend inland from major ports running on east-west axis, but is the only line to cross the country completely, connecting Lobito with the Zairian rail net at Luau in eastern Angola.

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Until the mid-1970s, the Benguela carried more than half of Zairian and Zambian minerals to market and returned a supply of imports to the copperbelt. Although completed in 1928, the line was improved through the early 1970s to a yearly capacity of 3 million tons in each direction and earned up to \$50 million annually in foreign exchange during peak

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operation. In recent years, the Benguela has been of only limited use even in domestic transport because of the prolonged guerrilla conflicts. Insurgents have consistently sabotaged bridges, rail, and rolling stock.

The remaining rail lines extend inland from Luanda to Malanje and from the port of Namibe to Menongue with a few spurs to reach some economically active areas, particularly for iron mining or coffee production. Their major function was to move exports to the seaports and agricultural produce to coastal population centers. Each line would require a costly extension to reach existing rail lines in adjacent countries.

The road network might better lend itself to regional trade. The Portuguese left behind over 36,000 kilometers of all-weather roads including 8,500 kilometers with asphalt surfaces. Paved roads join most district capitals and extend into Zaire and Namibia.

**Manufacturing.** At independence Angola possessed a rather wide range of manufacturing plants, but industry was geared almost entirely to producing goods for the domestic market; manufactured goods accounted for about 7 percent of total exports in 1973, although we estimate that industrial production was roughly 18 to 20 percent of GDP. All enterprises of any significance were located in the western part of the country where inexpensive electric power, transportation facilities, and most consumer purchasing power were found. The largest industrial concentration was at Luanda, but major plants were also situated at other ports, and there had been some buildup of manufacturing in larger cities of the plateau areas, such as Huambo and Lubango.

The most important industry was food processing, which accounted for 36 percent of the gross production value of the industrial sector in 1973. Among this subsector's main products were flour of various kinds, sugar, animal oils and fats, canned fish, canned preserves, confectionary, baked goods, and noodles. Textiles, chiefly cotton cloth and thread, ranked second; third place was occupied by beverage production of which the principal item was beer.

Performance in the manufacturing sector has been hampered not only by the absence of trained Portuguese managers and technicians but, more recently, by serious food and imported capital goods shortages. Most of the factories in Angola are working at only 20 percent of capacity and have an average absentee rate of 40 percent, with some as high as 70 percent

Many urban workers do not report for duty because they need to spend most of their day foraging for food. In addition, raw material shortages and a lack of spare parts have brought some production units to a complete standstill.

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**Petroleum.** Petroleum production and development of extensive oil reserves is Angola's leading industry, accounting for about 90 percent of total export earnings and almost all of its domestic tax revenue. Oil will probably play an increasingly important role in 1985 and beyond so long as the country is able to bring its rich reserves into production. Despite its capital intensity and large foreign participation, the industry does provide employment to a large number of native Angolans.

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The petroleum industry, which includes a refining facility in Luanda, has benefited from substantial private Western investment. The investments are primarily in the lucrative fields off the coast of Angola's Cabinda enclave. Angola produces an average annual output of about 176,000 barrels per day of high quality light crude. Angola's total reserves are probably as high as 2 billion barrels according to industry estimates, making it potentially one of Africa's leading oil producers.

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#### Moscow's Economic Role

The Soviets extended over \$430 million in economic aid to Angola from 1975 to 1982, of which only \$35 million was drawn. Questions about types of projects, the quality of Soviet assistance and advisory support, and the quantity of actual Soviet aid disbursements have been a constant source of friction in bilateral relations since the mid-1970s.

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Early in January 1982 Angola received a significant new Soviet commitment that eventually could provide up to \$2 billion in credits for economic development over a 10- to 20-year period. The agreement followed several years of feasibility studies and negotiations—a typical feature of Soviet economic programs. The accord probably will provide credits on near commercial terms. It calls for the USSR to construct heavy public-sector infrastructure and industrial projects that have become its specialty in the Third World:

- Moscow has signed a contract to provide \$400 million in equipment credits for the Capanda hydroelectric dam and power plant, which will be Angola's largest construction project.
- The Soviets plan to construct a 990,000-acre irrigation system, bridges, and other projects in Malanje Province.
- Luanda and Moscow are discussing the construction of an oil refinery at a yet unknown location.

In our judgment, the agreement will not meet Angola's current economic needs because it does not provide financial support for badly needed imports or highly skilled technical services needed to revitalize plant and equipment. [redacted]

Moscow has some 1,500 civilian advisers and economic technicians in Angola, many of whom are attached to various government ministries and state industries. In addition, there are some 7,000 to 8,000 Cuban and East European civilian advisers. [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet advisers work with the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank, and the fishing and mining industries. [redacted]

The large contingent of Cuban technicians is a particular source of friction with the Angolans. As food and consumer goods shortages became more pronounced, Angolans have become increasingly restive over what they see as a foreign monopoly of the few remaining imported food and consumer items. Luanda has even threatened to cut back on the number of Cuban civilians because of frictions over their salaries and working conditions. [redacted]

#### Outlook for the Economy

The two most important factors in determining the long-term future of the Angolan economy will be the oil sector and the insurgency. Oil will play an increasingly important role in 1985 and beyond so long as Luanda is able to bring its rich oil reserves into production. The level of the insurgency will largely determine whether vital foreign exchange earnings from the petroleum sector go to rebuild Angola's war-torn economy or to pay for more Communist military hardware and personnel support. [redacted]

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Prospects for development of the oil sector will remain good as long as the insurgents do not attack the oilfields. Crude oil exports in 1985 probably will rise above the 1983 level, from 136,000 b/d to about 200,000 b/d, based on information provided by the Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, and Western oil companies operating in Angola. Most of the increase will come from newly developed fields off the coast of Cabinda. Commercial exploitation of several of Angola's other rich offshore oil sites will probably begin by 1985. [redacted]

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If UNITA tightens its hold over the countryside, eventually isolating the country's diamond, agricultural, and other outlying regions and confining the government's area of control to the major cities, the regime would become almost totally dependent on oil revenues to meet current operating and defense costs. Oil probably would represent over 95 percent of foreign exchange revenues and almost all of Luanda's budget. [redacted]

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## Politics

### Background

The direct predecessor to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor party (MPLA) was the Party of the United Struggle of Africans of Angola, which was formed in Luanda in early 1953 by educated, urban "assimilado" (educated blacks granted the status of whites by the Portuguese) and Marxist mulattoes. In 1956, the party called for the formation of a clandestine organization for armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism and created the MPLA. Four years later, it elected as president the internationally known poet and political prisoner, Dr. Agostinho Neto, and began—with significant external help from the Soviet Bloc, Cuba, and various nonaligned countries—a faltering but persistent armed struggle against foreign rule. [redacted]

Throughout its years in exile, the MPLA was led largely by mulattoes and assimilados and based in the Kimbundu tribe, which occupies north-central Angola and composes about a quarter of Angola's population. Although the MPLA tried to diversify its popular support, the party still has not expanded significantly its narrow ethnic base. [redacted]

The movement was faction ridden from its earliest days. Initially, urban mulatto intellectuals and black populists vied for control of the leadership. As the desultory war with Portugal ground on, splits grew between the externally based leadership and guerrillas who carried on the battle within Angola, and also between military leaders from different battle fronts. [redacted]

Finally, the MPLA's quest for power was hindered by its rivalry with other liberation groups. In the early years, the MPLA's main competition was the Front for the National Liberation of Angola, which was based in the northern Bakongo tribe and sustained by support from Zairian and Western sources. After 1966 the MPLA also had to compete with the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), dominated by the large Ovimbundu tribe in central Angola and the personality of its founder, Jonas Savimbi. [redacted]

Following the military takeover of the Portuguese government, Lisbon, in January 1975, transferred power in Angola to a transitional government made up of a coalition of the three Angolan liberation movements. Violence soon erupted between the three groups, and the fighting turned into a full-fledged civil war. The MPLA eventually triumphed, primarily because of faltering Western aid to its opponents, early and rapid Soviet Bloc assistance to MPLA forces, the insertion of Cuban combat troops, and the MPLA's control of Luanda and the surrounding area. The MPLA's victory, however, probably did not reflect its actual popularity, and some observers believe Savimbi's UNITA would have won a free election. [redacted]

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The MPLA's narrow mulatto/assimilado/Kimbundu base and its chronic factionalism continued to plague the new regime after independence. Although it initially controlled most regions of the country, its mass support still came mainly from the Kimbundu. The dominant group in the party, moreover, was soon challenged by less-well-educated black populists who had carried the burden of the resistance from within Angola and resented the continuing dominance of the mulattoes. This opposition to the party leadership resulted in a coup attempt in May 1977 led by Nito Alves, a Political Bureau member whose base of support lay in the "musseques" (slums) of Luanda. The revolt was put down with the aid of Cuban troops, although several Politburo and Central Committee members were killed in the fighting. [redacted]

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By the time of Neto's death in 1979, we and other Western observers believe that he was attempting to move his regime toward closer relations with the West and was considering making an accommodation with UNITA, which was gaining strength in the southeastern third of Angola. We also believe that he was beginning to move against the hardline Marxist mulattoes in the Central Committee. [redacted]

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President Jose Eduardo dos Santos



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#### Party Structure

Today, the MPLA is run by a Central Committee composed of some 64 members and alternates. According to party statements, it is guided by a Politburo drawn from the Central Committee ranks and consisting of 11 members and three alternates. [ ]

Membership on the Central Committee and Politburo generally reflects an individual's political importance, although the correlation between party position and actual political clout is not exact. One Politburo member, former Defense Minister Joao Luis Neto, lost his influence in the late 1970s due to mental illness but kept his seat anyway. Several members of

the Central Committee appear rarely in public, have no known party or government jobs, and probably have little influence despite their position on the committee. Other committee members, particularly Planning Minister Lopo do Nascimento, appear to have power equal to most Politburo members. In addition, several figures holding key jobs in the central or regional governments appear to have influence equal to or greater than that of many Central Committee members. [ ]

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MPLA Central Committee immediately after Neto's death. [redacted]

The party's slowness in making senior personnel moves seems largely responsible for anomalies in matchups between party position and real power. During the 1980 MPLA congress, [redacted]

[redacted] the party's factions successfully blocked one another's candidates for the 20 vacant seats on the Central Committee. By the end of the congress, only 12 MPLA members [redacted]

were promoted to the Central Committee seats. Since the 1980 congress, there have been only a handful of formal personnel changes in the Central Committee and Politburo, and the party has postponed calling a new congress. [redacted]

Below the Central Committee, the MPLA is in a state of prolonged transformation from a popular front organization to a self-proclaimed workers' "vanguard" party. This change in party structure was also reflected in the addition of "Labor Party" to the name "Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola." In 1980, the MPLA claimed a membership of about 31,000, as opposed to 110,000 in 1977—a drop stemming from a tightening of criteria for party membership. [redacted]

Several ancillary organizations are closely controlled by the MPLA, including the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA), Youth of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (JMPLA), and the Angolan National Worker's Union (UNTA). OMA is headed by Central Committee member Ruth Neto, and UNTA is run by

veteran labor organizer and Politburo member Pascal Luvualu. The party is also attempting to organize the various professional sections in organizations under its control. [redacted]

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
Although our information on the Angolan military's political orientation is sketchy, the MPLA appears to have adequate control. All members of the high command are MPLA Central Committee members, although the depth of the party's penetration into the lower ranks is unclear. In December 1983, one senior official admitted publicly, in effect, that party organization among defense and security forces was weak. Moreover, various, often contradictory, reporting indicates that the military is divided between factions split along lines of tribe, ideology, rank, and generations. Although there have been rumors of planned coups by military factions, no group within the armed forces appears to have emerged as a threat to MPLA's control of Angola. [redacted]

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#### Leadership and Factions

The party and government are both headed by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who assumed office by constitutional means after the death of former President Neto in late 1979. Mulatto-led hardliners in the regime—along with the Soviets and Cubans—apparently backed him because they believed he would be

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Politburo member Lucio Lara: Nationalist, but anti-Marxist hardliner. (u)

weak and malleable. We believe the other major faction, the black nationalists known as the Catete group, also accepted dos Santos because of his close identification with the relatively moderate policy course that Neto had begun to pursue before his death.

[redacted] dos Santos was under attack from both factions [redacted] the hardline faction strongly supports the Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola, is firmly committed to backing the SWAPO-led struggle against South African control of Namibia, and opposes accommodation with South Africa or UNITA. The hardline faction has always been led by Lucio Lara, a senior party veteran and a mulatto.

The now largely defunct Catete faction—which drew its name from a town near Luanda that is the hometown of many of its members—was headed by Mendes de Carvalho, a black Central Committee member. Although the Catete group was less cohesive than the Lara faction, it generally sought to end the dominance of mulattoes in the party, lessen Angola's dependence on Soviet and Cuban aid, obtain better economic and political relations with the West, and work out a political accommodation with UNITA.

In the three years since the second party congress in late 1980—when dos Santos survived in power primarily because the rival factions prevented one another from agreeing on an alternative—President dos Santos has built his own power base by co-opting independent party figures and winning over members of the now lifeless Catete faction, and, to a lesser degree, members of the Lara faction. He also appears to have gained the loyalty of a sizable number of adherents in lower party and government ranks. [redacted]

Dos Santos has used his enhanced influence to consolidate further his position. In 1982 and 1983 he attacked, downgraded, or ousted from key party and government posts figures from the hardline and Catete factions, including Catete leader de Carvalho and a few close associates of Lucio Lara, as well as Lara's wife. During the same period, the Central Committee granted dos Santos "special powers" and gave him direct authority over new "Regional Military Councils" that have broad authority cutting across provincial boundaries. [redacted]

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In 1984, the party took several steps that indicate that dos Santos's grip on power may still be tightening:

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- In February, the Central Committee proved cohesive enough to allow negotiation of an agreement with Pretoria that required Luanda to reign in SWAPO guerrillas operating in southern Angola—a move we assume was not popular with the hardline faction.

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- In March, the party created a special "Council for Defense and Security" composed of party leaders with key security positions and members of the military's General Staff. The group was given a charter to deal with key economic and national security questions and apparently includes only firm backers of dos Santos.

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- In May, the regime felt strong enough to crack down on diamond smuggling and, [redacted] arrested at least two Central Committee members. The investigation, we believe, had been completed in 1983, but the party had balked at making arrests for fear it would be politically destabilizing. [redacted]

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
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**Key Men Around dos Santos**


Interior Minister "Kito" Rodrigues

Minister of State Security  
"Dino Matross" Paulo

Planning Minister Lopo do Nascimento

Minister of Provincial Coordi-  
nation "Kimba" Domingos

Minister of Defense "Pedale" Tonha

FAPLA Chief of Staff  
"N'Dalu" Franca

Despite his increasing power, dos Santos still must contend with significant opposition from the Lara faction, [redacted]

posts, and they appear to have strong influence in the party's propaganda organs. They also profit from significant external backing. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Cuban and Soviet officials have made pointed inquiries about the political well-being of hardline faction members under political attack and have warned MPLA officials not to harm them. We also assume that the Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans, 25X1

The hardliners owe their continuing influence, we believe, to several factors. Because of their superior education, they have served in many key government

**Table 2**  
**Angolan Cabinet, July 1984**

President	Jose Eduardo dos Santos
Agriculture and Forestry	Lt. Col. Evaristo Domingos
Construction and Housing	Jorge Henriques Flora
Defense	Col. Pedro Maria Tonha
Education	Augusto Lopes Teixeira
Energy	Lt. Col. Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem
External Affairs	Paulo Teixeira Jorge
Finance	Augusto Teixeira de Matos
Fisheries	Emilio Jose Guerra de Carvalho
Foreign Trade	Ismael Gaspar Martins
Health	Antonio Jose Ferreira Neto
Industry	Lt. Col. Henrique Carvalho Santos
Interior	Lt. Col. Manuel Alexandre Duarte Rodrigues
Internal Trade	Adriano Pereira dos Santos, Jr.
Justice	Diogenes Assis Boavida
Labor and Social Security	Horacio Pereira Bras da Silva
Petroleum	Lt. Col. Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem
Planning	Lopo do Nascimento
Provincial Coordination	Lt. Col. Evaristo Domingos
State Security	Col. Juliao Mateus Paulo
Transport and Communications	Manuel Bernardo de Sousa
Secretary of State for Cooperation	Carlos Antonio Fernandes
Secretary of State for Culture	Boaventura da Silva Cardoso
Secretary of State for Physical Education and Sports	Rui Vieira Dias Mingas
Secretary of State for Social Affairs	Rodeth Teresa Maquina Gil
Secretary of the President for Judicial Matters	Jose Silva
Secretary of the Council of Ministers	Flavio Joao Fernandes
Secretary of State for the National Bank	Augustos Teixeira de Matos

Although highly factionalized, we believe the leadership shares fundamental goals and an instinct for survival. All senior party members appear to seek the creation of a Marxist state controlled by an MPLA that they will continue to dominate. Most party leaders, including members of the hardline faction, probably want Angola's heavy dependence on foreign troops and military aid ended when security conditions permit. We doubt, moreover, that many senior party members would be willing to risk a genuine, long-term political accommodation with UNITA, although some might be willing to cut some sort of deal with UNITA as a means of neutralizing the insurgents.

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The most fundamental issues separating party leaders appear to be racial and personality disputes as well as tactical questions about how to move Angola out of its morass. Some senior officials also probably are divided over the degree of nonalignment they would like for Angola. This question, however, remains largely theoretical, in our view, as long as massive Cuban and Soviet support remains critical to the MPLA's survival.

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By mid-1984, the leadership seemed capable of somewhat greater decisiveness than in the past, but, in our judgment, may still be divided on several key tactical moves such as accommodation with UNITA, closer relations with the West, and the timing and circumstances of a withdrawal of Cuban troops. Before the regime can take bold action on these questions, it may be necessary for dos Santos to move decisively against the Lara faction—a move that would undoubtedly be strongly opposed by Luanda's Communist backers.

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#### Government

**People's Assembly.** According to official pronouncements, the "People's Assembly," created in 1980, is the "supreme organ of state power." In reality, it is only a thinly veiled front for the party leadership.

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The Angolan press claims that the Assembly has 206 deputies whose key function is said to be "drafting and approving laws and guiding and supervising the

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through overt and covert penetration of Angola's security organizations, are well informed on developments within the party and government and furnish covert aid to people they believe are allies.

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**Table 3**  
**Angola: Provincial Commissioners**

Province	Commissioner
Bengo	Manuel Lopes Maria "Xi-muto"
Benguela	Kundi Paiama (Chairman RMC VII)
Bie	Maj. Marques "Bassovava" Monakapui
Cabinda	Jorge Barros
Cuando Cubango	Maj. Manuel Francisco "Batalha de Angola" Tuta (Chairman RMC VI)
Cuanza Norte	Noe da Silva Saude
Cuanza Sul	Ramos da Cruz
Cunene	Pedro Mutinde
Huambo	Lt. Col. Joao Ernesto "Liberdade" dos Santos (Chairman RMC IV)
Huila	Maj. Rafael "Sambalanga" Sapilinha (Chairman RMC V)
Luanda	Mariano de Casta "Puka" Garcia
Lunda Norte	Jelim Paim
Lunda Sul	Jose Manuel Salucombe
Malanje	Joao Rodrigues "Ludy" Lopes (Chairman RMC IX)
Namibe	Fernando Faustino Muteka
Moxico	Maj. Joao Goncalves Lourenco (Chairman RMC III)
Uige	Zeferino Estevao Juliano
Zaire	Artur Vidal "Kumbi Diezabo" Gomes

According to the Angolan press, Assembly members are elected in a two-part process. The deputies are nominated by the MPLA, OMA, JMPLA, and UNTA. The nominees are then selected by an electoral college, whose members are selected by "cooperatives, strategic enterprises, state institutions, and military units."

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**Executive.** MPLA policy decisions—with the unswerving approval of the People's Assembly—are executed through a party secretariat, some 15-party departments, and 21 or more government ministries and state secretariats. President dos Santos also has his own staff, which has gained importance as he has expanded his powers. The ministries are headed by Politburo and Central Committee members as well as other senior government figures who have been selected because of their technical expertise and political influence. The President's new Defense and Security Council apparently serves as a supercabinet.

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**Provincial Governments.** At the provincial level there are also 18 People's Assemblies composed of from 55 to 85 deputies. Like the national Assembly, these are dominated by the party. The MPLA-appointed provincial commissioners also apparently serve as the presidents of the Provincial People's Assemblies and become, in effect, the governors of the provinces.

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work of the state's executive bodies." It meets infrequently as a body, and a 25-member "Permanent Commission" drawn from its membership is empowered to act on its behalf. The Commission, like the Assembly, is headed by dos Santos and is composed of the full MPLA Politburo and key Central Committee and government figures. Because of its powerful membership, the Commission is able to operate with confidence that its actions will be ratified by the full Assembly when it meets. Before the Seventh Session met in December 1983, for example, the government-controlled press asserted with certainty that the Assembly "will ratify documents already approved by its standing commission."

The powers of provincial and local officials, however, appear to have been limited in mid-1983 by the formation of at least six "Regional Military Councils." The RMCs oversee from one to three provinces, have powers to override local jurisdictions, and report directly to the President in Luanda. A provincial commissioner from within the RMC serves as Council Chairman. RMC members include the other provincial commissioners within the region and key local military commanders. Most provincial commissioners and Council presidents are also Central Committee members.

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**Table 4**  
**MPLA Leadership:**  
**Politburo and Central Committee<sup>a</sup>**

	Tribe	Party Position	Government Position	
<b>Politburo full members</b>				
Jose Eduardo dos Santos	Kimbundu	President Secretary for Cadres	President Chairman, Defense and Security Council FAPLA Commander in Chief	
Col. Joao Luis Neto "Xietu"	Kimbundu			
Col. Pedro Maria Tomha "Pedale"	Bakongo (Cabindan)		Defense Minister Member, Defense and Security Council	
Lt. Col. Antonio dos Santos Franca "N'Dalu"	Mulatto		Vice Minister Defense FAPLA Chief of Staff Commander, Presiden- tial Regiment	
Col. Joao Rodrigues Lopes "Ludy"	Bakongo (Cabindan)		Chairman RMC IX Provincial Commis- sioner, Malanje	
Lucio Lara "Tchikweka"	Mulatto	Secretary for Organiza- tion		

Pascoal Luvualu

Bakongo

UNTA Chief

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Lt. Col. Evaristo Domingos "Kimba"	Bakongo (Cabindan)	Minister of Provincial Coordination Member, Defense and Security Council
Lt. Col. Juliao Mateus Paulo "Dino Matros"	Kimbundu	Secretary for Defense and Security Minister of State Security Member, Defense and Security Council
Lt. Col. Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues "Kito"	Kimbundu	Member, Central Control Commission Minister of Interior Member, Defense and Security Council
Lt. Col. Francisco Magalhaes Paiva "N'Vunda"	Bakongo	FAPLA Political Commissar Member, Central Control Commission Vice Minister of Defense

**Politburo alternate members**

Lt. Col. Henrique Carvalho Santos "Onambwe"	Mulatto	Secretary for State and Judicial Organs	Minister of Industry
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Kundi Paiama	Ovambo	President RMC XII Provincial Commissioner, Benguela
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Roberto de Almeida "Jofre Rocha"	Kimbundu	Member, Central Control Commission Secretary for Ideology, Information, and Culture	Member, Defense and Security Council
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**Central Committee full members**

Manuel Lopes Maria "Ximuto"	Kimbundu	Member, Central Control Commission	Provincial Commissioner, Bengo
Lt. Col. Manuel Francisco Tuta "Batalha de Angola"	Bakongo		President, RMC VI Provincial Commissioner, Cuando Cubango

Lopo Ferreira do Nascimento	Mulatto Kimbundu	Minister of Planning Member, Defense and Security Council
Col. David Antonio Moises "N'dozi"	Kimbundu	

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**Table 4**  
**MPLA Leadership:**  
**Politburo and Central Committee <sup>a</sup> (continued)**

Tribe	Party Position	Government Position
<b>Central Committee full members</b>		
Joao Baptista "Jamba Ya Mina"	Kimbundu	Provincial Commissioner, Bie
Lt. Col. Jose Cesar Augusto "Kiluanje"	Kimbundu	
Jorge Tchimpuati	Cabindan-Chokwe	
Armando Dembo	Kimbundu	
 Lt. Col. Zacarias Pinto "Bolingo"		
Maj. Celestino Bernardo "Tchizaninga"	Chokwe	Secretary for Agricultural Cooperatives
Lt. Col. Joao Ernesto dos Santos "Liberdade"		President RMC IV Provincial Commissioner, Huambo
Manuel Quarta "Punza"	Bakongo	Secretary for Administration and Finance
Lt. Col. Antonio Bernardo "Mainga"	Kimbundu	
Afonso Van-Dunem "Mbinda"	Kimbundu	Secretary for External Relations
Lt. Col. Paiva Domingos da Silva "Mussuca"	Kimbundu	Vice Defense Minister Commander of ODP
Rodeth Gil		Secretary of State for Social Affairs
Rogerio Chikuekue "Sapilinha"	Kimbundu	
Antonio Jacinto "Brauno"	White	Chairman, Central Control Commission

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Maria Mambo Cafe "Tchyina" Kimbundu	Secretary for Economic and Social Policy	
Lt. Col. Delfim de Castro	Vice Minister State Security	
Lt. Col. Manuel Augusto Alfredo "Orlog"	Vice Minister Defense	
Lourenco Jose Ferreira "Dian-dengue"	Secretary of State, Housing	
Lt. Col. Miguel Joao Luis "Ivadi"	Kimbundu	
Mariano de Casta Garcia "Puku"	Ovambo	Member, Central Control Commission
Manuel Pedro Pacavira	Kimbundu	Provincial Commissioner, Luanda Vice Minister of Interior
Manuel Bernardo de Sousa	Kimbundu	Minister of Transportation and Communication
Ruth Neto	Kimbundu	Secretary of OMA
Lt. Col. Rafael Sapilinha "Sambalanga"	Chokwe	Chairman RMC V Provincial Commissioner, Huila
Lt. Col. Santana Andre Pitra "Petroff"	Bakongo (Cabindan)	Secretary for Production and Energy
Paulo Texeira Jorge	Mulatto	Foreign Minister
Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho	Kimbundu	Ambassador, East Germany
Domingos Afonso Neto "Kota Neto"	Kimbundu	
Jeronimo Sinedine		

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**Table 4**  
**MPLA Leadership:**  
**Politburo and Central Committee <sup>a</sup> (continued)**

Tribe	Party Position	Government Position
<b>Central Committee full members</b>		
Celestino Chinhama "Faisca"		
Hermino Joaquim Escorcio	Mulatto	Director of Sonangol
Col. Henrique Teles Carreira "Iko"	Mulatto	Air Force Chief
Artur Vidal Gomes "Kumbi Diezabo"	Kimbundu	Provincial Commissioner, Zaire
Carlos Cangulo Domingos	Kimbundu	
Domingos Francisco Bartolomeu	Kimbundu	
Filipe Kinguengo "Mabiola"	Kimbundu	
Joao Henriques Garcia "Cabelo Branco"	Bakongo	
Jose Carlos Ylenga "Explosivo"	Chokwe	
Paulo Massengo "Sentir"	Kikongo	Deputy Provincial Commissioner, Zaire
Tchicassa "Kassumby Wafa Mase"	Ovimbundu	
Ambrosio Lukoki "Nzaqimvena"	Bakongo	

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
**Central Committee alternate members**

Jacinto Joao Antonio "Toneno" Kimbundu

Lucrecia Alfredo Antonio Kimbundu  
Francisco

Luis Sebastiao Mateus "Voz  
do Povo" Kimbundu

\* Note: Ranking in this chart does not necessarily reflect seniority.



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## Foreign Relations


Angola proclaims itself to be a Marxist-Leninist state, and its closest ties are to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other "progressive countries." The regime also asserts that it desires normal relations with "other countries" based on "mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and noninterference." Angola has extensive formal diplomatic ties with countries throughout the world, but, primarily for financial reasons, maintains diplomatic mission in relatively few countries. [redacted]

Angolan foreign policy objectives, in our judgment, stem largely from Luanda's civil war against the expanding UNITA insurgency and, to a lesser degree, its disastrous economic situation. As a result, we judge the key goals of its foreign policy are:

- To obtain massive amounts of foreign military assistance, primarily from Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
- To persuade South Africa, through direct talks and diplomatic pressure, to cut off support for the insurgency, to withdraw from its territory, and eventually to leave Namibia as part of the independence process.
- To persuade the United States to put pressure on South Africa to drop its insistence on linking withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to a UN-sponsored settlement in Namibia.
- To obtain economic aid, technical assistance, and foreign investment from the West to develop the Angolan economy and offset Angola's heavy dependence on Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. [redacted]

### Soviet Bloc and Cuban Ties

Soviet Bloc and Cuban influence in Angola rests largely on the Communists' provision of military assistance. After helping the MPLA to secure power at the time of Angolan independence in 1975, the USSR formalized its relationship with Angola by signing a 20-year Friendship Treaty in October 1976 and began, with its East European allies, a continuing



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*Soviet-made weapons captured from Angolans in operation "Protea" in 1981.* [redacted]

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program of military assistance. Cuba also supported the new regime by keeping forces in Angola after the independence struggle. [redacted]

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Although annual increments of Soviet military aid declined after 1976, Moscow and its allies concluded a total of almost \$1 billion in military agreements with Angola by the end of 1981. They provided Luanda with a wide array of weapons including tanks, armored personnel carriers, MI-8 all-purpose helicopters, MIG-17 and MIG-21 aircraft, and small surface craft. [redacted]

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The Soviets sharply increased their arms shipments to Angola in 1983, largely in response to increased attacks by UNITA and South African military incursions into southern Angola. Moscow introduced more advanced weapons—including MI-24 attack helicopters and MIG-23 advanced fighters—to shore up Luanda's air and counterinsurgency defenses, boosting the annual level of arms shipments to record levels. [redacted]

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Moscow may have provided a senior expert in antiguerrilla warfare in 1983 to oversee Luanda's counterinsurgency effort. [redacted]

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President dos Santos meets Angolan students in Kiev, USSR, May 1983.

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Since late 1983, Havana also has augmented its military presence in Angola to stiffen the government's will to fight and to man some of the new, more advanced equipment. We estimate there are currently as many as 35,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola, including about 25,000 combat troops. There are also, we believe, about 1,200 Soviet military advisers in Angola and about 500 East German military and security personnel who are involved primarily in the regime's internal security and intelligence apparatus.

In return for its investment, the Soviet Union has obtained access to facilities that it uses for reconnaissance flights over the South Atlantic.

Moscow also has sought rights to establish a naval base in Angola, which it already maintains on a de facto basis with the permanent stationing of vessels at Luanda.

#### Economic and Political Ties

Formal economic and technical cooperation between Angola and the USSR began in May 1976 with the signing of an agreement on economic cooperation. In January 1982, Angola received a significant Soviet commitment that eventually may provide up to \$2 billion in credits over a 10- to 20-year period for construction of heavy public-sector infrastructure and industrial projects, according to Angolan press accounts. The agreement followed several years of feasibility studies and negotiations—a typical feature of Soviet economic programs—and probably provides credits on near commercial terms. As part of this overall agreement, Moscow has:

- Signed a contract to provide \$400 million in equipment credits for the Capanda hydroelectric dam and power plant on the Cuanza River, which will be Angola's largest construction project.
- Agreed to construct a 990,000-acre irrigation system, bridges, and other projects in Malanje Province.

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In addition to these projects, Angolan press reports indicate Soviet technicians and their surrogates are involved in assistance projects relating to agriculture, fishing, transportation, shipbuilding, public health, meteorology, and cartography. We believe there are about 1,500 Soviet civilian advisers and economic technicians in Angola in addition to some 8,000 Cuban and East European civilian advisers. [redacted]

The Soviets and their allies also provide a wide variety of training, both overseas and in Angola. According to the Angolan press, 2,500 technicians were trained with Soviet assistance from 1978 to 1982. Many have been trained in the Soviet Union, including MPLA Politburo and Central Committee members who have received several years of military training. [redacted]

Cuba also has provided civilian training as well as formal education. On Cuba's Isla de la Juventud, for example, four secondary schools are reserved for the exclusive use of some 2,400 Angolan teenagers, a number of whom move on to Cuban universities after graduation. Other Angolans in Cuba are attending technical institutes, research centers, and schools run by the party and mass organizations for training political cadres. The high school students have traditionally been a source of trouble—some have behavior problems stemming from culture shock—and many have been sent home well before finishing their education. [redacted] the training is intensely unpopular with its participants who, we believe, are kept isolated on the island to prevent contact with the Cuban population. [redacted]

The Soviet Union and its allies maintain party-to-party relations with the MPLA and frequently exchange party delegations. Political, military, and economic ties are further cemented by annual trilateral meetings between senior officials from Angola, Cuba, and the USSR. Soviet political relations in Angola appear to be directed by their ambassador in Luanda. [redacted]

### Multiple Strains

Despite frequent public professions of close fraternal ties, Luanda's relations with the Soviet Bloc and Cuba have suffered significant strains. Issues such as types of projects, the quality of Soviet assistance and advisory support, and the quantity of actual Soviet aid disbursements have been constant sources of friction in bilateral relations. [redacted]

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The government is particularly resentful of the Soviets' overfishing in Angolan waters, and it has resisted signing long-term fishing contracts. [redacted]

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[redacted] the regime has also resisted committing Angola to the Capanda power project on the grounds that it did not want a long-term commitment to the Soviets. Luanda sought assistance in agricultural projects and light industry instead but, after considerable Soviet pressure, the MPLA went along with the dam project. [redacted]

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Another source of irritation appears to be Angola's slow repayment of its financial obligations to its Communist creditors. [redacted]

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Luanda has attempted to reschedule payments for military and economic assistance, but has met stubborn resistance from its Communist debtors. [redacted]

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[redacted] Moscow had agreed reluctantly to a debt moratorium on civil and military debt. [redacted]

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Luanda also resents the heavy cost of the large contingent of Cuban military and civilian personnel. As food and consumer goods shortages become more pronounced, Angolans have been increasingly restive over what they see as a Communist monopoly of the few remaining imported food and consumer items. The Angolans have also complained about the poor quality of the military assistance they are provided and the unwillingness of Cuban troops to become involved in direct combat with South Africa and UNITA. [redacted]

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Moscow and Havana have apparently matched Angolan complaints by criticizing the regime's shoddy military and economic performance. [redacted]

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[redacted] Moscow has been critical of the Angolan Ambassador in Moscow for purchasing a Mercedes for his private use. [redacted]

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[redacted] Cuban and Soviet officials have lectured President dos Santos and other senior party officials on how to conduct internal affairs. We believe that they have recommended personnel changes within the government, expressed displeasure over the position held by individuals they believe may be pro-West, and actively supported party figures they believe favor strong ties to Moscow and Havana. [redacted]

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The most serious cause of friction, in our view, is political differences between the MPLA and its patrons over political negotiations with the West and the continuing presence of Cuban troops. We believe Soviet Bloc and Cuban officials have lobbied against closer political relations between Luanda and the West, although they appear to give qualified support to Angola's quest for Western economic assistance. [redacted]

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longer used. Of greater value is the consistent political and diplomatic support most of these and other African governments provide Angola in its effort to isolate South Africa. [redacted]

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Angola also looks to non-African "progressive" regimes outside of the Soviet Bloc for material and diplomatic support. Yugoslavia, for example, has had longstanding ties with the MPLA leadership, supplies limited military assistance, and serves as a model to some in the MPLA because of its socialist internal policies and external nonalignment. [redacted]

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Angola has made a special effort to develop economic and political ties with Brazil, a fellow Lusophone state, and Argentina. It has encouraged them to back aggressive "Africanist" positions and has viewed them as potential aid donors and sources of technical assistance. With Moscow's apparent blessing, Brazil participates in the Soviet-financed Capanda dam project. [redacted]

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*The West.* Angola has made aggressive use of its relations with West European governments and Communist parties to oppose linkage of the Cuban troop presence in Angola to a Namibian settlement. When an Angolan delegation makes an official visit to a Western country or receives a delegation, Luanda typically attempts to craft a joint communique condemning linkage. In private talks with Western counterparts, Angolan officials usually try to persuade them to put pressure on the United States to abandon its support of linkage and secure support for an economic boycott of South Africa. [redacted]

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Luanda also trades with and receives small amounts of economic and technical assistance from Western Europe. Sweden has made Angola one of its target countries for developing projects. A French oil company has explored for oil offshore and produced some operating wells. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Italians have engaged in joint fishing ventures—at the expense of the Soviets—and have set up a technical school in Luanda. Italy, like several other European countries, has donated food assistance. [redacted]

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#### Other Ties

**Nonaligned.** Among African states, Luanda's relations have taken on military dimensions. Since 1975, Angola has established limited military ties with Guinea, Nigeria, Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Madagascar, Somalia, and Botswana. Some agreements, however, have lapsed or are no

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Castro and dos Santos sign joint communique in Havana, March 1984. [redacted]

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**Portugal.** Because of historic personal, cultural, economic, and emotional relations, Angolans maintain special ties to Portugal. The relationship, however, has fluctuated widely since independence. The high point was probably reached in 1982. [redacted]

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Since that time, we believe, Moscow has worked to undermine Angolan-Portuguese relations by attempting to stigmatize the Portuguese as sympathetic to UNITA. The press in Lisbon—which reports extensively on UNITA operations in Angola and its unofficial presence in Portugal—also helped to sour relations. [redacted]

In 1983, relations between the two countries began a new cycle of decline. Portugal put on a large commercial exhibition in Angola in hopes of expanding trade, but Luanda soon destroyed any good effects it might have had by charging, in shrill press attacks, that UNITA was being given a completely free hand in Lisbon. In December, after announcing it would undertake "economic reprisals" against Portugal, Luanda excluded a Portuguese oil company from exploring offshore and formed a high-level committee to

review all technical assistance agreements with Portugal. [redacted] 25X1

In early 1984, Lisbon sent Foreign Minister Jaime Gama to Luanda to smooth over relations. According to diplomatic reports, the Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge lectured him on aiding UNITA and demanded more foreign assistance. Gama publicly promised not to allow Portugal to be used as a platform for destabilization but, according to diplomatic reporting, begged off furnishing further aid. Angolan press attacks against Lisbon have subsequently abated somewhat, but Luanda has since hosted—with considerable publicity—a delegation headed by the Secretary General of the Portuguese Communist Party, and the bilateral relationship remains cool. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

The only military assistance the Portuguese apparently provide is given, [redacted]

[redacted] unofficially by a group of retired military officers and mechanics who serve in Angola in a training capacity. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

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## Armed Forces

Security conditions in Angola have steadily deteriorated since independence. Luanda has had to cope with conventional military operations by South African forces in southern Angola, UNITA guerrillas in the central highlands, and in the last few years, semiconventional operations by UNITA battalions. Other insurgencies, the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in northern Angola and the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) in Cabinda, have been annoying but not threatening.

Operation "Reindeer," which featured an airborne raid on a SWAPO headquarters at Kassinga in May 1978, marked the first major South African operation into Angola after the intervention in the 1975-76 independence struggle. The Kassinga raid initiated a series of attacks against SWAPO targets that increasingly involved clashes with Angolan forces. The Angolans have responded by constructing a Soviet-supplied and largely Cuban-manned air defense system in southern Angola, and by redeploying in the south military units from more northerly garrisons.

Operation "Protea" conducted by the South Africans in August and September 1981 was the largest operation in postindependence period, and was the first direct attack on Angolan forces. Two Angolan brigades were routed and suffered substantial casualties. The South Africans established a buffer zone in southern Angola that has been aggressively patrolled and occupied by their regular and irregular forces. Angola established a forward defense line in front of the buffer zone to prevent deeper incursions. In Operation "Askari," December 1983 through January 1984, the South Africans captured the town of Cuvelai, a key position on the forward defense line, and pushed north as far as Kassinga.

Angolan-South African-US negotiations led to a disengagement agreement signed at Lusaka, Zambia, in February 1984. Under the agreement, the South Africans would gradually withdraw from Angola in

return for Angolan commitment to prevent SWAPO from operating in the area vacated by Pretoria. Both sides agreed to establish a joint monitoring commission to police the disengagement area. Angola, in our judgment, viewed the agreement as a respite from the threat of South African attacks and an opportunity to turn its attention to UNITA.

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Since the mid-1970s UNITA has sustained a guerrilla effort in the central highlands while building a secure rear area and headquarters in the sparsely populated southeastern corner of Angola. In late 1982, UNITA began a series of offensives that greatly expanded its area of control and intensified the guerrilla war throughout the country. Semiconventional forces moved out from the southeast and raided as far north as the Benguela Railroad. In August 1983, UNITA captured Cangamba in a direct assault on a fortified camp held by Angolan regular forces. In response, Angola has been forced again to shift its forces to meet the expanded insurgent threat.

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### FAPLA

The Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) consists of an army, air force, navy, and militia—all subordinated to the Ministry of Defense. Cuban and Soviet advisers reorganized and retrained the preindependence guerrilla army of the MPLA to create FAPLA, which appears to be modeled generally on Soviet and Cuban patterns. Angola's continued inability to provide a trained cadre capable of serving in the technical, administrative, and specialist functions needed by a conventional army has required Angola to maintain its dependence on Cuban and Soviet assistance.

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The general absence of information on the inner workings of the armed forces, the high desertion rate, recruiting difficulties, and the large numbers of Cubans performing technical functions make it difficult

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**Table 5**  
**Angolan Military High Command**

Col. Pedro Maria Tonha "Pedale"	Minister of Defense
Lt. Col. Antonio dos Santos Franca "N'Dalu"	Vice Minister of Defense Chief of Staff
Lt. Col. Roberto Leal Monteiro "N'Gongo"	Deputy Chief of Staff
Lt. Col. Floribert Monimambo	Chief of Operations
Lt. Col. Manuel Augusto Alfredo "Orlog"	Vice Minister of Defense Commander of the Navy (MGPA)
Col. Henrique Teles Carreira "Iko"	Commander of the Air Force (possible Vice Minister of Defense)
Lt. Col. Paiva Domingos da Silva "Mussuca"	Vice Minister of Defense Commander of the ODP
Lt. Col. Francisco Magalhaes Paiva "N'Vunda"	Vice Minister of Defense Armed Forces Political Commissar

to estimate the strength of the armed forces. Estimates of the strength of the People's Militia are particularly soft. The overall strength of the Angolan armed forces probably is on the order of 100,000 men, plus or minus 20,000.

The President of the MPLA is the Commander in Chief of FAPLA. Operational control of the armed forces is given to the Minister of Defense and five vice ministers who head the general staff. The political factionalism that characterizes the civilian government also influences the armed forces since senior military officials play a significant role in party politics

Command of the army and militia contingents in the field is exercised through the military regions which divide the country along provincial borders. The military regions are responsible for military operations within their boundaries as well as administrative duties such as recruiting and training. The boundaries of the military regions have been redrawn several times over the years, most recently in 1983 when the country was divided into 10 military regions.

In July 1983, President dos Santos announced the formation of regional military councils that report directly to him. So far, six military councils—whose membership includes provincial leaders and the senior military commander in the region—have been designated, and represent essentially the imposition of martial law since all military and civil authority has been placed in these councils.

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**Army.** The Angolan Army probably consists of at least 35,000 troops, although some reports suggest a force level as high as 45,000 men. The brigade is the basic tactical element, although there may be some independent battalions.

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the Angolans have at least 17 brigades, b

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they may have as many as

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30. The brigades which we have identified appear to have three infantry or motorized infantry battalions, tank, artillery, antiaircraft, and motor transport battalions as well as reconnaissance, communications, and engineer elements. Their authorized strength is probably about 2,200 to 2,400 men, although few FAPLA brigades are at full strength and most probably are significantly under strength.

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Furthermore, operational requirements probably have caused the Angolans to modify the brigade organization. Army units in southern Angola may be involved in conventional operations with South African forces, for example, and are more likely to have the full complement of tanks and artillery than FAPLA brigades in central or northern Angola that are engaged primarily against UNITA insurgents.

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The Angolans have deployed their forces in a series of major garrisons—generally one per military region—each served by an improved all-weather airfield. These large garrisons, which usually include the military region headquarters and a substantial Cuban contingent, apparently are the main support base for military operations in the region. The airfield allows the garrisons to be resupplied by air, reducing their vulnerability to isolation by UNITA ambushes on the main roads. Outside the enclaves, smaller garrisons guard other important towns or economic facilities. The government forces, by and large, appear to be tied down in static defense of roads, bridges, rail lines,

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
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**Figure 8**  
**Angolan Government Ground Forces**



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and smaller towns and villages. The periodic sweeps into the countryside by government troops are easily evaded by insurgent groups and leave no lasting mark on the countryside. [redacted]

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**Air Force.** We believe that the Angolan Air Force, which also includes the command responsible for air defense, has a strength of about 2,000 men. Despite Soviet and Cuban efforts to train Angolan pilots and technicians, the Air Force apparently relies on a substantial number of Cubans to fly and maintain the more advanced aircraft. [redacted]

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The Angolans have greatly expanded in recent years the number of operating airbases. The main support base is in Luanda where newly delivered aircraft are assembled and checked out. Lubango, in southern Angola, is the largest and best equipped airbase in Angola. In 1983, the Angolans began improving the facilities at Menongue, Luena, Huambo, Bie, Malanje, and Saurimo. Combat aircraft have been stationed at these airfields and are moved from base to base as necessary. [redacted]

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The air defenses were largely constructed in 1978 and 1979 after several South African air raids in southern Angola. The Soviets supplied air warning and surveillance radars as well as SA-3 missiles at Namibe, Lubango, and Matala. In addition, the Soviets provided substantial numbers of antiaircraft guns and short-range SA-7 and SA-9 missiles. In 1983 the Soviets sent SA-6 and SA-8 tactical air defense missiles to supplement the system and in 1984 installed new SA-3 launchers at Menongue and Luanda. [redacted]

25X1

Despite the Cuban pilots and plentiful Soviet equipment, the Angolan Air Force has not played a decisive role in combat operations against either the South Africans or UNITA insurgents. Since 1981, South African air incursions into Angola have been challenged only twice by Cuban-flown MIG-21s. On both occasions, South African Mirage fighters shot down Angolan aircraft. [redacted]

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The delivery of MI-24 armed helicopters in late 1983 may increase the Air Force's effectiveness. The MI-24s are more suited to counterinsurgency operations than any other aircraft in the country. Although UNITA units have traveled in the past with little fear of air attack, Savimbi recently warned his followers in a radio address to be alert for this possibility. [redacted]

25X1

**Navy.** The Angolan Navy is a small force consisting of about 40 craft—primarily small patrol boats and landing craft—and about 1,500 to 2,000 men. Naval headquarters is at Luanda, where most of the naval force is stationed, although patrol craft have been sighted on occasion at other ports in Angola including Lobito, Namibe, and Soyo. [redacted]

25X1

The primary mission of the Navy is coastal defense, and the main weapons are the six Osa-class missile patrol boats delivered by the Soviets in 1982 and 1983. The Soviets have also provided coastal surveillance radars for Namibe, Lobito, Luanda, and Cabinda. (S NF)

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Angola's vulnerability had been clearly demonstrated in late 1981 when a seaborne South African raiding party severely damaged Angola's only petroleum refinery at Luanda. Again, in November 1982, South African seaborne commandos destroyed a key railroad bridge near Namibe. [redacted]

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Logistic support of the Army is another important mission for the Navy. The landing craft in the Angolan Navy apparently shuttle supplies and equipment between Luanda and the railheads at Lobito and Namibe. It apparently is safer and more reliable to transport by sea along the coast than to risk ambushes on Angola's poor road system. [redacted]

25X1

**Peoples' Militia.** The Peoples' Defense Organization (ODP) was established as an adjunct to the regular Army and apparently intended to maintain security in regions that have been pacified by the Army. Unlike the Army, the ODP is not expected to participate in major field operations but instead defends fixed positions. [redacted]

25X1

Overall strength of the ODP is uncertain. At one time, the government said the citizens militia was targeted for a strength of several hundred thousand. Other estimates have put its strength as low as 20,000. However, the prevalence of ODP outposts throughout the country suggests a greater strength, probably about 60,000 to 65,000. [redacted]

25X1

Compared to the Army, the ODP has been short-changed in regard to training, weapons, and support. Moreover, since ODP forces are deployed in small ill-defended outposts where they have been easily attacked by insurgents, the poorly trained and equipped

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militia units are largely ineffective. We believe the government has been sufficiently discouraged by the ODP's prior performance to consider abolishing the organization, but is dissuaded by its inability to adopt any alternative. [redacted]

#### Other Security Forces

The Ministry of Interior is responsible for the Angolan Police Corps (CPPA) which has civil police responsibilities and internal security duties as well. We believe the CPPA has about 8,000 men. The Ministry of State Security is responsible for the 6,000-man Border Guards (TGFA) and may also have some internal security troops. [redacted]

In 1983, the government also established volunteer Popular Vigilance Brigades to augment the military and security forces. These elements of uncertain size may or may not be armed and probably are intended to mobilize party members and regime adherents into security roles. [redacted]

#### Cuban Military Contingent

The MPLA owed its victory in the postindependence civil war to direct Cuban military assistance. Cuban forces have remained in Angola to train the Angolan Army and stiffen the country's defenses against its internal and external threats. The Cuban military presence in Angola numbers as many as 35,000 men of which about 25,000 are combat troops assigned to ground force combat units, air defense missile and radar units, and an air force contingent. The remaining Cuban military personnel serve primarily as technicians, specialists, and administrators serving the Angolan Army, but also include advisers, instructors, and staff officers. [redacted]

The Cuban combat forces in Angola appear to be organized in brigades similar to those of the Angolan Army. The Cubans may now have seven or more brigades in Angola. Until recently, most of the Cuban forces were stationed in southern and central Angola, but because of the expansion of UNITA activity Cuban units now occupy major garrisons in northern and eastern Angola as well. [redacted]

The Cubans have augmented their forces in Angola on several occasions in response to changes in South African or UNITA activity. After Operation Protea in late 1981, the Cubans sent several thousand men to

Angola, most of whom were deployed to positions in southern Angola as backups to Angolan Army units. In 1983, Havana sent several thousand more troops that apparently manned additional air defense equipment delivered by the Soviets, and moved into garrisons in northern and eastern Angola where the expanding UNITA insurgency threatened the government's hold. In addition, some of the Cuban forces withdrawing from Ethiopia apparently are being transferred to Angola, but we do know the total number. [redacted] 25X1

Despite the willingness to augment their forces, the Cubans retain their longstanding reluctance to take a major role in the fighting. We believe Havana sees its mission as a supporting role, whether against the South Africans, where Cubans man the main defense line behind the Angolan Army or against UNITA, where they guard and secure the main base areas. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

Recently, however, the Cubans have become more involved in a combat role. In the 1970s most observers reported that the Cuban troops stayed mainly in their garrisons. [redacted] it appears 25X1 that in some instances Cuban forces have contributed elements to Angolan operations. Nevertheless, the Cubans have yet to adopt an aggressive combat presence in Angola. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

#### Military Assistance

Since the first military agreement was signed in 1976, the Soviets have provided nearly all of Angola's arms. The first Soviet arms deliveries supported the transition from an MPLA guerrilla force to a conventional army, but largely consisted of obsolescent equipment. [redacted] 25X1

Since late 1982, Soviet military assistance has increased as the Angolan Government reacted to the expanding UNITA threat and South Africa's military occupation of south-central Angola. The number of arms shipments to Angola in 1983 increased by more than 50 percent over 1982. Furthermore, recently delivered Soviet weapons have been more advanced than equipment delivered in the 1970s. [redacted] 25X1

Air defense weapons apparently have received the highest priority in Soviet deliveries. In early 1983, Angola was the first Sub-Saharan country to receive



Cuban soldiers in Angola, June 1983. [redacted]

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SA-8 missile launchers, and later that year 20 SA-6 launchers were delivered. The Angolans also received more SA-3 launchers—sufficient for five more missile sites as well as additional SA-9 launchers and more conventional antiaircraft guns. [redacted]

East Germans, for example, have delivered substantial numbers of trucks. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania have also provided arms. [redacted]

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Since late 1982 the Soviets have provided at least 60 more MIG-21 interceptors and 14 MIG-23s including two trainer versions. The Angolans also received 24 MI-8 transport helicopters and 12 MI-24 armed attack helicopters. [redacted]

Angola also has tried to tap arms suppliers in Europe as well as Brazil. With the exception of Alouette helicopters provided by France and PC-7 trainer aircraft purchased from Switzerland, Western nations have had difficulty competing with Soviet terms and quantities. [redacted]

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To bolster Angola's coastal defenses, the Soviets have delivered six Osa-class missile patrol boats since late 1982 as well as the SS-N-2 antiship cruise missiles carried by the boats. The Soviets also provided Angola with coastal surveillance radars. [redacted]

The Soviets are believed to have at least 600, and possibly as many as 1,500, military advisers in Angola serving in a variety of advisory, technical, and tutorial positions. Soviet military personnel are present in all major Angolan headquarters, but probably are most heavily involved at the higher echelons and in the Ministry of Defense. The Soviets provide instructors to Angolan military schools, and Soviet specialists and technicians have been identified in various Angolan air defense and air units working in cooperation with Cuban advisers. [redacted]

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In addition to the arms aid, the Soviets in 1983 augmented their military airlift contingent in Angola with more AN-12 transports. The Soviets now have 12 of these aircraft in Angola—the largest number the Soviets have in any Third World country. These aircraft have provided vital airlift support to Angolan garrisons otherwise isolated by UNITA ambushes on roads and rail lines. [redacted]

Other East European countries are also involved. The East Germans apparently have the largest contingent, with approximately 500 advisers assigned to Angola's police and security services and to help with communications security. [redacted]

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Although the Soviets supply most of the military assistance, East European countries and Cuba have also sent weapons or other military equipment. The

Insurgencies

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## Insurgencies

Angola is fertile ground for insurgent groups. At least six currently operate in the country: three in armed opposition to the MPLA government in Luanda, and three that provide various degrees of support to the MPLA and in turn are sheltered and supported by Luanda. [redacted]

### UNITA

Of the three antigovernment insurgencies that oppose the Angolan government, only UNITA presents any significant threat to the regime in Luanda. With a fighting strength of about 35,000 men, UNITA claims a presence throughout the southern two-thirds of Angola and, within that area, control of the southeastern quadrant. UNITA is also pushing farther north and has publicized plans to expand its operations throughout the country. [redacted]

**Objectives.** UNITA's ultimate aim is to end the MPLA's monopoly on political power in Luanda and through its sustained military pressure ensure that no government that excludes UNITA can rule. Eventually, in UNITA's view, the MPLA will be forced to negotiate an end to the civil war and share power with the insurgents. [redacted]

UNITA's pursuit of negotiations rather than outright military victory reflects, in our view, its recognition that the presence of more than 30,000 Cuban troops effectively forecloses the likelihood of an insurgent military victory. UNITA also recognizes that an MPLA driven out of Luanda could well become a guerrilla force capable of harassing a new UNITA government. So far, Luanda has rejected publicly any thought of negotiating with UNITA, although some reporting suggests there are elements within the MPLA, possibly including President dos Santos, that privately favor talks with UNITA. [redacted]

In November 1982, UNITA began a series of major offensives with the stated objective of forcing the MPLA into negotiations. Subsequently, the insurgents have increased their area of control by driving

government influence from most of southeastern Angola, intensified guerrilla operations and isolated major government centers in the central highlands, expanded raids into previously untouched areas of northern Angola, increased attacks on major economic targets, and generally weakened Luanda's hold on the country. [redacted]

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**UNITA's Early Years.** Jonas Maliehro Savimbi founded UNITA on 23 March 1966 after breaking with Holden Roberto's Front for the National Liberation of Angola movement over what most observers ascribe to a conflict of personalities. Savimbi and several of his associates received military training in China and initially operated from bases in Zambia with a headquarters in Lusaka. The movement grew rapidly because of energetic organizing among Savimbi's fellow Ovimbundu and smaller eastern Angolan tribes. The Ovimbundu, which make about 40 percent of Angola's population and are the largest of Angola's various ethnic groups, have remained UNITA's main source of support. Still, UNITA was smaller and weaker than the Zairian- and Western-backed FNLA and the Soviet-supported MPLA. [redacted]


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Zambia expelled Savimbi and his followers in 1967 because of Portuguese pressure following UNITA attacks on the Benguela Railroad. In 1968 Savimbi returned to Angola with the help of SWAPO, which at that time had close ties to UNITA. Savimbi established a headquarters in the sparsely populated southeastern Cuando Cubango Province, which still serves as his base of operations, headquarters, and refuge. UNITA's main theater of military and political operations, however, was the populous central highlands, where the Ovimbundu predominate and UNITA finds its most fertile ground for recruitment and support. [redacted]

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**Figure 9**  
**UNITA Presence in Angola**



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In the civil war following independence in late 1975, the Soviet- and Cuban-backed MPLA, with the help of Cuban troops, was victorious over the FNL and UNITA and its South African allies. Some Western observers assert, however, that Savimbi had sufficient support among the Angolan population to win if elections had been held in Angola. [redacted]

Instead, a defeated Savimbi and a few dedicated followers returned to the bush to rebuild the movement and continue the fight. In UNITA legend, 8 February 1976 marks the beginning of the "long march" back to the southeast and the start of the postindependence war against the MPLA. In the ensuing years, UNITA gradually consolidated its control over the southeast and carried on a guerrilla war in central Angola. [redacted]

**Leadership.** Savimbi is UNITA's unchallenged leader as party president and commander in chief of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA), UNITA's military wing. Savimbi's personal leadership, in our judgment, has been the most important single factor in the movement's growth and its sustained will to win. [redacted]

Savimbi's immediate subordinates are said by most observers to be tough, intelligent, and battle hardened. The leading officials are party Secretary General Miguel Puna, reputed number-two man and long-time Savimbi associate, and the military Chief of Staff, Demostenes Chilingutila. Puna is a Cabindan, and the UNITA leadership includes a few other non-Ovimbundus as well. Savimbi is said to have expressed satisfaction that a new generation of leaders had risen to take over responsible positions. Some older party stalwarts were dropped from the Politburo and put out to pasture at the 1982 party congress. [redacted]

In his management of the movement, Savimbi apparently delegates responsibility for most day-to-day tactical and administrative matters to his subordinates but has the final say on the major decisions. We know little of internal UNITA politics, but there have been a few reports of disagreement among Savimbi's followers over whether UNITA should pursue a total military victory or, alternatively, seek to force the MPLA to the bargaining table. Savimbi reportedly still favors a political settlement, and we believe his subordinates acquiesce in his decision. [redacted]

**Organization.** A 17-member Politburo is the top party organ and the movement's primary decisionmaking body. The Politburo is chosen by the Central Committee that includes party workers and military officials, many of whom live and work "behind the lines" in regions of Angola where UNITA carries on its guerrilla war with the MPLA. [redacted]

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The Central Committee is selected at periodic party congresses. Over 1,000 party members attended the most recent party congress in July 1982 at Mavinga in UNITA-controlled southeastern Angola. [redacted]

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To administer the territory UNITA claims to control and provide a shadow government in contested regions, UNITA has established a functioning civilian government under a Coordinator of General Administration. This government provides an array of rudimentary, but apparently well-run, health, educational and social services, and agricultural enterprises. In addition, the party maintains a women's (LIMA) and youth (JURA) wing. [redacted]

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Military operations are directed by a Strategic Operations Command (COPE) headed by Savimbi, which includes senior Politburo members and ranking military commanders. The UNITA general staff, under Chilingutila, includes directors of operations, logistics, transportation, and other traditional staff responsibilities and transmits general policy and strategic decisions to the troops in the field. UNITA's military organization receives high marks from a variety of observers, and even one senior Angolan military official has ruefully described UNITA's logistics as "impeccable." [redacted]

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**Strength.** We estimate, on the basis of Savimbi's statements and other evidence, that UNITA's military strength includes some 15,000 regular troops and 20,000 guerrillas. In addition, UNITA may have another 30,000 generally unarmed and untrained supporters or adherents—which probably includes the families of the fighters—as well as civilians and farmers in UNITA-controlled areas. [redacted]

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Savimbi rallies his troops. 

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Ovimbundus still predominate in UNITA ranks, but Western reporters who have traveled with the insurgents say that UNITA has been able to recruit from other tribal groups. UNITA has sought consistently to extend its ethnic base in order to support operations in previously uncontested regions and to buttress its claim to represent the majority of Angola's ethnic groups.

**The Military Arm.** UNITA divides Angola into three military areas, each characterized by the degree of UNITA control, the military situation, and the type of operational activity.

The *area of influence* encompasses roughly the southern two-thirds of Angola and represents the region where the insurgents claim to have at least a presence and a self-sustaining organization. This area is divided into 22 military regions each of which is responsible for the civil administration and social welfare of the UNITA supporters in that region, as well as for military operations as assigned by the high command.

For larger military operations, military regions are collected into "fronts" under a senior commander, and the local guerrillas are reinforced by regular battalions or brigades.

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The *area of control*—roughly the entire southeastern quadrant of Angola—represents the area in which Luanda's influence has largely been eliminated, except for a few isolated garrisons, and UNITA operates openly as the only governmental authority. This area contains UNITA's headquarters at Jamba, training and supply bases, weapons depots, repair and maintenance facilities, and a fleet of several hundred trucks.

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**Jonas Savimbi**

*Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, founder and unchallenged leader of UNITA, was born on 3 August 1934 of Ovimbundu parents in Munhango, central Angola. Western officials and others who have met Savimbi portray him as intelligent, able, and charismatic. He has been described as readily accessible to his followers and as a captivating orator. He also has a reputation for personal courage and was the only leader of a major Angolan insurgent group to personally lead his troops from inside Angola during the independence struggle. His personal magnetism appears to have won him a measure of popular backing from other tribal groups as well as widespread support among his fellow Ovimbundu.*

*Savimbi has not been firmly wedded to any particular ideological orientation. In recent years he has described himself as a moderate socialist and has espoused economic policies that combine socialism and free enterprise. Savimbi has also propounded a philosophy of black power or "Negritude" probably in part as a reaction to the role played within the MPLA regime by Marxist-oriented mulattoes. He has insisted that his approach is not "racist" and that he is simply arguing for having blacks, who comprise the vast majority of the Angolan population, hold the key positions in any Angolan regime. He has also urged a policy of nonalignment to contrast UNITA with the MPLA's reliance on the "Neocolonialist" Cubans and Soviets.*

*UNITA appears to lack other figures with Savimbi's broad personal appeal, international recognition, and exceptional leadership abilities, and his removal through death or incapacitation would be a severe setback. UNITA probably would not wither away, but would be considerably weakened and disorganized, at least in the short term. Ultimately, it could emerge as a more inflexible movement seeking an all-out military victory rather than a negotiated solution. UNITA might also become more heavily influenced by South Africa without a leader of Savimbi's stature to maintain a degree of independence.*

**Table 6**  
**UNITA Politburo**

Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi	Party President Commander in Chief of FALA
Miguel N'Zau Puna	Party Secretary General
Demostenes Amos Chilinguitila	Chief of the FALA General Staff
Samuel Martinho Epalanga	Commander of the Military Police
Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda	National Political Commissar, FALA
Dr. Antonio Vakulukuta	Coordinator of General Administration
Engineer Jeremias K. Chitunda	Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Renalto Campos Mateus	Chief of Operations for the General Staff
Engineer Ernesto Joaquim Mulato	Secretary for Natural Resources, Internal and External Trade
Carlos Kandanda	Representative in Europe
Engineer Antonio Dembo	Representative in Africa
Smart Chata	Secretary for Nationality, Justice, and for National Patrimony
Eugenio Ngolo	Permanent Secretary of Central Committee
Pedro N. Chingunji	Deputy Foreign Secretary
Assistant members	
Armindo L. Paulo Gato	Staff General Director
Vincente Vihemba	Front Political Commissar
Joao Mety	Finance Secretary of Central Committee

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UNITA's *area of expansion*—the northern third of the country—is not an area of traditional UNITA strength, and the insurgents have had no permanent presence there. In the last few years, however, UNITA has targeted this area and plans to carry its operations to all of Angola's provinces, including the oil enclave of Cabinda.

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*UNITA plans offensive on Nova Sintra, a village near the Benguela Railroad.*

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UNITA's regular forces are organized in what the insurgents call semiconventional battalions of 400 to 500 lightly armed troops that have received at least three months of military training. The battalions can either operate independently or in three-battalion brigades of about 1,500 men. UNITA began forming these battalions in the late 1970s and now has more than 30 in the field.

10 battalions were fighting north of the Benguela Railroad with more to follow. UNITA claimed two of its brigades were involved in the raid on the Provincial capital at Sumbe in March 1984.

UNITA's full-time guerrillas are organized in units of about 100 to 150 trained men called "columns," which are responsible for attacks on lines of communications, sabotage of economic targets, and raids on smaller or less-well-defended government installations. The columns are generally assigned military regions, although there are specially trained groups of

commandos or sabotage experts that are directed by the UNITA high command. In addition, smaller groups of part-time guerrillas live and fight in their home areas and often act as auxiliaries to the regulars and full-time guerrillas.

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UNITA equips its forces mainly with rifles and other light infantry weapons. Artillery support for the semi-conventional battalions and brigades is provided by light mortars and recoilless rifles. The insurgents have captured some heavier weapons from the Angolan Army, but they are not frequently used.

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**Outside Assistance.** Although the insurgents capture a substantial amount of their arms and ammunition from government forces, we believe they rely heavily on military supplies from South Africa, purchase of other weapons on the international arms market, and older stocks of Western arms supplied in the 1970s.

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UNITA forces on operation in central Angola.

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We believe Pretoria has increased its support to the insurgents over the past few years and has fueled UNITA's upsurge in activity. South Africa materiel assistance is important to UNITA because of its regularity and reliability. Such assistance has included arms and ammunition, military training, financial credits, trucks and fuel, spare parts, food, medicines and medical treatment, exchange of intelligence, and a continuing close liaison. Savimbi has openly acknowledged that the insurgents accept aid from South Africa, although he has not been completely candid about the extent of the assistance.

recent battlefield gains. UNITA representatives abroad report a greater openness on the part of some European and African countries.

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Past supporters and backers include France, which provided arms, supplies, and training but cut off its aid after the socialists came to power in 1981. Morocco provided training and arms and has facilitated contacts between UNITA and Arab countries. Saudi Arabia has provided considerable financial aid. China was one of UNITA's earliest supporters and furnished substantial quantities of small arms and other supplies in the late 1970s

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UNITA has received aid from a variety of other sources, but such assistance fell off in the late 1970s as more governments recognized Luanda. Nevertheless, there are signs that some old friends are again warming to UNITA as a result of the insurgents'

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Western-oriented Black African nations also have helped by facilitating shipments of foreign supplies to UNITA-controlled areas, furnishing UNITA representatives with travel documents or permitting UNITA discrete representation in its capitals. There is some evidence that Zaire allows UNITA to operate on its territory or, at least, turns a blind eye to a UNITA presence. [redacted]

#### Other Insurgencies

UNITA has shown little interest in establishing ties to other insurgencies opposing the MPLA. Instead, UNITA has extended an invitation to join on a "take it or leave it" basis. UNITA's relations with the groups supported by Luanda have ranged from wary neutrality to open conflict with SWAPO and outright hostility toward the FLNC. [redacted]

The *Front for the National Liberation of Angola* (FNLA) incorporates the remnants of Holden Roberto's preindependence liberation movement and survives as a low-level, politically isolated, and fragmented insurgency in the northern regions of Angola. Observers who have had contact with the FNLA insurgents describe them as fighting mainly out of force of habit rather than with any realistic expectation of success. [redacted] MPLA may be having some success in an amnesty campaign to encourage FNLA members to lay down their arms. [redacted]

The *Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave* (FLEC) is a small factionalized group confined to Cabinda Province and which aims for secession from Angola. The FLEC is responsible for a few incidents in the interior of Cabinda, but poses no realistic threat to either Angola or even Cabinda Province. [redacted]

The *South-West Africa People's Organization* (SWAPO) is the most significant of the groups allied to the MPLA that shelter in Angola. SWAPO, with about 6,000 armed insurgents in Angola plus many thousands of refugees, has carried out a cross-border war into northern Namibia from bases in southern Angola. SWAPO's presence in Angola there has led to repeated South African attacks on Angolan forces and occupation of Angolan territory. In an effort to ease the direct South African threat, Luanda agreed

in Lusaka in February 1984 to block SWAPO infiltration in return for a South African withdrawal from its buffer zone in southern Angola. The majority of SWAPO's guerrillas are probably committed to fight UNITA in various regions of Angola. [redacted]

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The *Front for the National Liberation of Congo* (FLNC) consists of several thousand Zairian exiles and former Katangan gendarmes that have in the past been involved in two invasions of Zaire's Shaba Province. The FLNC, with camps in northeastern and eastern Angola, have been relatively quiet since Angola reached an agreement with Zaire in 1978 to cease supporting or encouraging the other's insurgencies. Many FLNC fighters are engaged against UNITA, a war for which they have little enthusiasm. [redacted]

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FLNC forces are being moved away from the areas of fighting in the east to reorganize. [redacted]

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The *African National Congress* (ANC), a black South African liberation group, has its military headquarters in Luanda and conducts most of its military training camps in northwestern Angola. [redacted]

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ANC military units were used briefly in counterinsurgency operations against UNITA with little effect. [redacted]

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## Statistical Summary

### Land

Area: 1,245,790 square kilometers—nearly twice the size of Texas and roughly 4 percent of the African continent.

Coordinates: Between 5 degrees and 17 degrees south latitude and between 12 degrees and 24 degrees east longitude.

Land boundaries: 5,070 km.

Coastline: 1,600 km.

Limits of territorial waters: 20 nautical miles (fishing 200 nm).

Rivers (perennial): Cuanza (850 km), Cunene (825 km), Cubango (800 km), Zambezi (275 km).

Climate: Predominantly tropical with a distinct wet season (maximum length, September/October through April/May) and a dry season (May to September). Annual average rainfall ranges from less than 50 millimeters along the southern coast to over 1,500 mm in the northeast.

Vegetation: Mostly savanna with isolated baobab and acacia trees on the interior plateau, merging into desert-steppe in the southern part of the plateau. Forested in the Western Highlands, the extreme north, and along water courses.

### People

Population: 7,770,000 (United Nations estimate for July 1984). Nearly half of the population is under 14.

Population density: Approximately 6.2 persons per square kilometer.

Average annual population growth rate: 2.6 percent.

Urban population: 25 percent.

Geographic distribution: About 60 percent of the people are concentrated in the western and central parts of the Interior Plateau and in Luanda.

Ethnic divisions: 98 percent African (including 37 percent Ovimbundu, 25 percent Kimbundu, and 13 percent Bakongo) and 2 percent mulatto (in 1983).

Religion: About 40 to 45 percent of the Africans are Roman Catholic, 10 percent are Protestant, and 45 to 50 percent are animist. Mesticos are almost all Roman Catholic.

Language: Portuguese (official). Local languages are in the Bantu language group.

Adult literacy: 15 to 20 percent.

Schools: 1 million primary school students (two-thirds of the population between ages 5 and 14) and 100,000 secondary school students (10 to 12 percent of the 15 to 19 age group) as of 1977.

Medical facilities: We know little about the period since independence, but in 1970 there were about 7,000 hospital beds located in about 100 hospitals and 225 aid stations.

**Government**

Legal name: People's Republic of Angola.

Capital: Luanda.

Type: Marxist-Leninist people's republic; achieved independence from Portugal in November 1975.

Legal system: Formerly based on Portuguese civil law and customary law; modified since independence along Marxist-Leninist lines.

Leader of the government: Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President.

Political parties: The ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is the only legal party. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is a South African-backed insurgent group that is waging war against the government. Another insurgent group, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), currently is inactive.

**Economy**

GDP: \$4.2 billion (1981 estimate); \$550 per capita.

Agriculture: Cash crops—coffee, cotton, sisal, bananas, tobacco, corn, sugar, and manioc; food crops—cassava, corn, vegetables, plantains, bananas, and other local foodstuffs.

Fishing: Catch of about 112,414 metric tons (1982).

Mining: Petroleum is found in Cabinda, northwestern Angola, and near Luanda. Many other minerals have been found, but only diamonds and iron ore are important.

Traditional major industries: Mining (oil, diamonds, and iron ore), food processing, brewing beer, tobacco processing, cement, and building construction.

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Electric power: 630,000 kilowatt capacity (1983), 1.6 billion kilowatt-hours produced (1983), 210 kWh per capita.

Economic aid: Economic commitments—Western (non-US) countries ODA and OOF (1970-81), \$334 million; Communist countries, 1975-present, \$535 million; EX-IM (FY 1970-82), \$104 million; OPEC ODA (1974-82), \$35 million.

Fiscal year: Calendar year.

Budget: \$3.5 billion (1980).

Monetary unit: Kwanza.

Monetary conversion rate (official): 30.2 kwanza = US\$1 as of July 1982.

#### **Transportation and Communications**

Railroads: Three unconnected lines of 1.067-meter gauge running almost parallel inland from the ports of Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe for a total of 2,879 kilometers of rail; a small fourth line of 310 kilometers of 0.600-meter gauge running from Porto Amboim to Gabela for a combined total of 3,189 kilometers.

Roads: 73,828 kms total; 8,577 km paved, 29,350 km crushed stone, gravel, or improved earth; the remainder are dirt roads and tracks.

Ports: three major (Luanda, Lobito, Namibe), five minor.

Civil air: Transportes Aereos de Angola (TAAG) operates six US-manufactured jet aircraft on routes to western Europe, Moscow, and several African capitals as well as smaller Soviet-made aircraft on domestic routes. Additional international service is provided by the Portuguese airline Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP) and Cuban, Soviet, and East European airlines.

Inland waterways: 1,165 km navigable.

Telecommunications: Fair system of wire and radio relay; troposcatter radio-relay system under construction; HF used extensively for military and Cuban links; one Atlantic Ocean satellite station; 29,100 telephones (0.65 per 100 population); 15 AM and five FM stations; one television station.

Newspapers: One daily and 15 weekly, total circulation about 30,000.

#### **Defense Forces**

Military manpower: Compulsory conscription for both men and women from ages 18 through 35.

Major military unit: FAPLA (Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola).

Personnel: Total armed forces roughly 100,000: Army 35,000; Navy 1,500; Air Force 2,000; Peoples' Defense Organization (militia) 60,000.

Ships: three medium amphibious assault landing ships, six missile attack boats, 18 patrol boats, and other small craft.

Aircraft: 100 jet combat, 80 helicopters, 60 transports and utility aircraft. Inventory includes MIG-23, SU-22, and MI-24.

Missiles: SA-3/GOA, SA-6/GAINFUL, SA-7/GRAIL, SA-8/GECKO, SA-9/GASKIN.

Supply: Predominantly from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba.

**Intelligence and Security** Department of Information and Security (DISA), charged with domestic foreign intelligence collection, was formally disbanded in August 1979 and its function transferred to the Ministry of Interior.

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### **Chronology**

1483 Portuguese first arrive in Angola.

1885-86 Congress of Berlin fixes boundaries of Angola and other Portuguese territories in Africa.

1951 Portugal declares Angola an overseas province.

1956 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is established as Angola's first anti-Portuguese independence movement, with headquarters in Guinea.

1958 Holden Roberto organizes Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA).

1961 March Roberto's Bakongo tribe rebels against Portuguese in northern Angola.

September Portuguese administration abolishes legal distinction between "assimilated" and "unassimilated" Africans.

1962 Jonas Savimbi joins Roberto in forming National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), based in Leopoldville, Congo (now Kinshasa, Zaire). FNLA establishes Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), with Roberto as "Prime Minister" and Savimbi as "Foreign Minister."

1963 Organization of African Unity (OAU) formally recognizes GRAE.

1964 Savimbi ends alliance with Roberto and leaves FNLA.

1966 Savimbi and followers form National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

1968 Marcello Caetano succeeds ailing Antonio Salazar as Portuguese Prime Minister. Gulf Oil begins to pump oil in Cabinda.

1971 OAU withdraws recognition from GRAE.

1974	April	Young Portuguese military officers overthrow Caetano regime in Lisbon, promising self-determination for Portugal's overseas territories.
	July	Portuguese President de Spinola officially acknowledges the right of overseas provinces to full independence and recognizes all three Angolan independence movements (MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA). Also appoints a five-member military junta to govern Angola.
	September	De Spinola is forced to resign, leading to the installation of a new government that calls for immediate decolonization.
1975	January	Alvor Accord establishes a MPLA-FNLA-UNITA coalition transitional government, and sets 11 November 1975 deadline for Angolan independence.
	March	Soviets send first substantial amounts of military aid to MPLA, giving it weaponry superior to that of rivals.
		First major hostilities of Angolan civil war begin, evidently at FNLA's initiative.
	August	A small number of South African forces occupy Cunene dam complex just inside Angolan border.
		South African and MPLA forces clash about 25 miles inside Angola.

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Cuba begins sending troops to Angola.		
October	Some 2,000 South African troops invade Angola and advance to within 100 kilometers of Luanda.	
	Angola signs 20-year Friendship Treaty with USSR; Moscow begins major airlift of heavy weapons.	
November	First major clash between Cuban and South African troops.	
	Havana steps up airlift of Cuban forces.	
	Angola grants full independence by Portugal. MPLA forms government of People's Republic of Angola with Agostinho Neto as President.	
	MPLA and Cubans repel advances by the FNLA, UNITA, and South African forces.	
1976	January	Cuban military buildup continues.
	February	OAU recognizes MPLA regime and admits as a member.
		US Senate passes Clark Amendment prohibiting the granting of US security assistance to insurgent groups in Angola without Congressional authorization.


	March	South Africans complete withdrawal of their troops from Angola.
	May	Agreement on economic cooperation signed with USSR beginning formal economic and technical cooperation.
	June	United States vetoes Angola's application for membership in United Nations.
	November	UN admits Angola, with United States abstaining and China not taking part in vote.
1977	March-May	National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) mounts an attack on Zaire's Shaba Region from Angolan territory; is driven out by Moroccan forces. Zairian President Mobutu accuses MPLA regime of helping plan the invasion.
	May	Faction of MPLA, led by Interior Minister Nito Alves, attempts coup against Neto; Cuban troops help suppress uprising.
1978	May	South African paratroopers raid a major SWAPO guerrilla base at Kassinga, some 250 kilometers inside Angola.
		FLNC again invades Shaba Region and is driven out by French and Belgian forces.
	July-October	Several meetings held between Neto and Mobutu, in which they agree to establish diplomatic relations and to try to ease bilateral problems such as their support for insurrections against each other.
1979	September	Neto dies of cancer in Moscow. MPLA Central Committee chooses Minister of Planning Jose Eduardo dos Santos as new President.
	December	Dos Santos visits Moscow, given red-carpet treatment.
1980	March	Dos Santos visits Cuba and affirms that Cuban troops will remain in Angola until "imperialist and South African aggression" ends.
	July	South Africans launch "Operation Smokeshell," a large-scale ground and air operation against SWAPO bases in southern Angola.
	December	MPLA party congress reconfirms dos Santos as Angola's President.
1981	April-May	US officials state that withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola would facilitate Namibian independence.
	May-June	Newly elected socialist government in France decides to terminate French aid to UNITA.

	July	US Export-Import Bank extends \$85 million loan to Angola to finance offshore oil development project—the first Ex-Im Bank loan to Angola since independence in 1975.
	September	South Africa carries out major military incursion, "Operation Protea," aimed at destroying SWAPO guerrilla forces in southern Angola. SWAPO and Angolan forces suffer heavy casualties; four Soviet personnel also killed. South African-controlled "buffer zone" created inside Angola.
	December	Savimbi makes private visit to United States to seek political and financial support for UNITA.
1982	January	Angola receives Soviet commitment that may provide as much as \$2 billion in credits over 10- to 20-year period for construction of heavy infrastructure and industrial projects.
	February	Angola and Cuba issue joint statement declaring that Cuban forces will be withdrawn once Namibia has become independent from South Africa and the threat of "aggression" against Angola has ended. Senegal becomes last black African state to recognize MPLA regime.
	June	Ambassador Vernon Walters heads US delegation to Luanda and discusses key bilateral and regional issues with President dos Santos.
	September	Angola and China establish diplomatic recognition.
	December	Senior Angolan and South African officials meet at Cape Verde to discuss ways to reduce tensions.
Late 1982– April 1983		UNITA carries out its most successful military offensive to date, virtually doubling the territory it dominates in Angola's southeastern quadrant while expanding guerrilla operations in the central and northeastern regions.
1983	January	Dos Santos ousts more than 30 activists from the MPLA, most of them hardliners. Some are later reinstated.
	February	South African and Angolan officials meet again at Cape Verde and discuss possibility of a limited disengagement in southern Angola, but fail to reach agreement.
	April	Angolan Interior Minister Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues discusses the Cuban troop question and other issues with senior US officials in Washington, including Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz.
	May	Dos Santos visits Moscow and meets with top Soviet leaders including General Secretary Andropov.

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	June	Dos Santos fires regime's leading "moderate," Health Minister Mendes de Carvalho.
	August	UNITA semiconventional forces capture Angolan garrison at Cangamba; largest such attack. Luanda deeply shaken by reverse and alleges South African participation.
	September	High-level Angolan delegation travels to Moscow apparently seeking additional arms aid. Soviet military shipments up sharply in final months of year.
	November	UNITA begins major offensive slated to last through the rainy season ending in April 1984. Goals of campaign are to expand operations throughout the country, disrupt oil- and diamond-producing areas, and increase control of rural areas around isolated government garrisons.
1984	December-January	South Africans launch operation "Askari" in southern Angola. Airstrikes and ground assaults conducted on Angolan forward positions. Cuvelai is captured and South Africans drive as far as Kassinga—deepest ground penetration into Angola since the 1970s.
	February	Angola negotiates US-brokered agreement with South Africa at Lusaka that requires Luanda to rein in SWAPO guerrillas in southern Angola in return for a phased withdrawal of South African forces.
	March	UNITA captures and briefly holds Sumbe—first raid on a provincial capital. Savimbi demands direct talks with Luanda and promises to carry the war to Angola's cities if his demands are not met.
		"Council for Defense and Security" created. Includes key party and military officials, all of whom are dos Santos supporters.
		President dos Santos and entourage make highly publicized visit to Cuba. Official communique reaffirms standard position on Cuban troop withdrawal.
	April	UNITA explodes car bomb in Huambo and Havana admits 80 casualties, including 14 Cubans killed. Described by UNITA as first incident in new urban terrorism campaign.
		Angolan and South African delegations meet in Lusaka to iron out differences over South African troop withdrawal.
	May	UNITA begins another major campaign. Fighting to be intensified in northern provinces.

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